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Abstract Weconsidermodels ofmulti-player gameswhere abilities of players and coalitions
are defined in terms of sets of outcomes which they can effectively enforce. We extend the
well-studied state effectivitymodels of one-step games in twodifferentways.On theonehand,
we develop multiple state effectivity functions associated with different long-term temporal
operators. On the other hand, we define and study coalitional path effectivity models where
the outcomes of strategic plays are infinite paths. For both extensionswe obtain representation
resultswith respect to concretemodels arising fromconcurrent game structures.Wealso apply
state and path coalitional effectivity models to provide alternative, arguably more natural and
elegant semantics to the alternating-time temporal logic ATL*, and discuss their technical
and conceptual advantages.
Keywords Multi-step games · Coalitional effectivity models · Alternating-time temporal
logic
1 Introduction
Awide variety ofmulti-player games can bemodeled by so called ‘multi-player gamemodels’
[16,29], a.k.a. ‘concurrent game models’ [6]. The models can be seen as a generalization of
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both extensive form games and repeated normal form games. Here, we view them as general
models of multi-step games. Intuitively, such a game is based on a labelled transition system
where every state is associated with a normal form game, with outcomes being possible
successor states, and the transitions between states are labelled by tuples of actions,1 one
for each player. Thus, the outcome of playing the normal form game at any given state is a
transition to a new state, respectively to a newnormal formgame. In the quantitative version of
such games, the outcome states are also associated with payoff vectors, while in the version
that we consider here, the payoffs are qualitative—defined by properties of the outcome
states, possibly expressed in a logical language. The players’ objectives in multi-step games
can simply be about reaching a desired (’winning’) state, or they can be more involved, such
as forcing a desired long-term behaviour (transition path, run) again possibly formalized in
a suitable logical language such as the linear time temporal logic LTL.
Various logics for reasoning about coalitional abilities in multi-player games have been
proposed and studied in the last two decades—most notably, Coalition Logic (CL) [27] and
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL* and its fragment ATL) [6]. Coalition Logic can be
seen as a logic for reasoning about abilities of coalitions in one-step games to bring about an
outcome statewith desired properties bymeans of single actions. On the other hand, ATL and
ATL* allow to express statements about multi-step scenarios. For example, the ATL formula
〈〈C〉〉Fϕ says that the coalition of players or agents2 C can ensure that ϕ will become true
at some future moment, no matter what the other players do. Likewise, 〈〈C〉〉Gϕ expresses
that the coalition C can enforce ϕ to be always the case. More generally, the ATL* formula
〈〈C〉〉γ holds true iff C has a strategy to ensure that any resulting behavior of the system (i.e.,
any play of the game) will satisfy the property γ .
Oneway to characterize the abilities of players and coalitions to achieve desirable outcome
of the game is in terms of coalition effectivity functions, first introduced in cooperative
game theory [25]. Intuitively, an effectivity function in a game model assigns, at every
state of the model and for every coalition C , the family of sets of possible outcomes X
for which the coalition has a suitable collective action. The collective action must guarantee
that the outcome would be in the set X regardless of what the other players choose to
do at that state, i.e., that C is be “effective” for the set X at that state. This concept is
at the core of the “coalition effectivity models” studied in [27] and used there to provide
semantics for CL. “Alternating transition systems”, originally used to provide semantics for
ATL in [4], are closely related. Building on a result from [30], Pauly obtained in [27] an
abstract characterization of “playable” coalition effectivity functions that correspond to the
α-effectivity functions in concrete models of one-step games. Later, that characterization was
corrected and completed in the case of infinite state spaces in [19].
In this paper we study how multi-step games can be modeled and characterized in terms
of effectivity of coalitions with respect to possible outcome states on one hand, and outcome
behaviours on the other. We also show how such models can be used to provide conceptually
simple and technically elegant semantics for logics of multi-player games such as ATL*. The
paper has three main objectives:
(i) To extend the semantics for CL based on one-step coalitional effectivity to semantics
for ATL over state-based coalitional effectivity models;
1 Such actions are also called ‘strategies’ in normal form games, but we reserve the use of the term ‘strategy’
for a global conditional plan in a multi-step scenario.
2 Here we use the terms ‘agent’ and ’player’ as synonyms and use the term ‘coalition’ to refer to a set of agents
that may be pursuing a common objective, but without assuming any explicit contract or even coordination
between then.
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(ii) To develop the analogous notion of coalitional path effectivity representing the powers of
coalitions in multi-step games to ensure long-term behaviors, and to provide semantics
for ATL* based on it;
(iii) To obtain characterizations of multi-player game models in terms of abstract state and
path coalitional effectivity models, analogous to the representation theorems for state
effectivity functions cited above.
We argue that characterizing effectivity of coalitions in multi-step games in terms of
paths (cf. points (ii) and (iii) above) is conceptually more natural and elegant than in terms of
outcome states, in several respects. First, collective strategies in such games generate outcome
paths (plays), not just outcome states. Second, one path effectivity function is sufficient to
define the powers of coalitions in a multi-step game for all kinds of temporal patterns,
through the standard semantics of temporal operators. This point is further supported by the
fact that path effectivity models provide a conceptually straightforward semantics for the
whole language of ATL* (which is not definable by alternation-free fixpoint operators on the
one-step ability). Thus, the path-effectivity based semantics for multi-step games essentially
simulates the state-effectivity based semantics for one shot games. By encapsulating the
notion of a play as primitive, it provides a clear and conceptually simple interpretation of
the ATL(*) operators. Finally, we argue that path effectivity can just as well be applied to
variants of ATL(*) with imperfect information, where even simple modalities do not have
fixpoint characterizations [12].
Motivation Effectivity functions provide mathematically elegant semantics of interaction
between agents, in which properties of interaction are “distilled” and abstracted away from
concrete details of implementation. This makes them significantly different from concurrent
game models that focus on how concrete actions interfere and give rise to transitions, and
how they can be used to build long-term strategies. In contrast, coalitional effectivity models
present abilities in a “pure” form. This does not mean that effectivity models are supposed
to replace concurrent game models in the semantics of logics like ATL. On the contrary,
the two kinds of structures occupy largely different niches. Concrete models of interaction
(such as concurrent game models) are more appropriate when one wants to build a model of
an actual system, and possibly verify some actual requirements in it. Abstract models (such
as coalitional effectivity models) serve better when used to investigate properties of classes
of systems. Moreover, correspondence results between concrete and abstract models reveal
structural properties of the former in a way that is difficult to achieve otherwise.
Such correspondence results are important for several reasons:
– First of all, they characterize the limitations of concrete models. That is, they showwhich
structural conditions must inevitably hold in simple models that are constructed in terms
of concrete states, actions, and their combinations.
– Secondly, they characterize which abstract patterns of effectivity can be implemented by
concrete models.
– Thirdly, they characterize classes ofmodels for which the concrete and abstract semantics
of strategic logics can be used interchangeably.
To make the motivation more tangible, we apply the characterizations obtained in this
paper to gain insight into properties of two other classes of structures. In Sect. 6.2, we apply
our results to the well known models of “seeing to it that” (stit). We show that stit models are
too general and too restricted at the same time. On the one hand, the stit framework allows
for models that are not playable, in the sense that they cannot be implemented by concrete
games. On the other hand, stit models accept only a very limited palette of coalitional ability
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patterns. Both features follow immediately from our characterization results from Sect. 5,
which demonstrates the analytical power of the results. Moreover, in Sect. 6.3, we use path
effectivity functions to expose properties of imperfect information scenarios, encoded in
imperfect information concurrent game models (iCGM).
Related work We study correspondence between patterns of coalitional effectivity vs. stan-
dard models of long-term interaction, which are typically used in the field of multi-agent
systems (cf. e.g. [17,35]). Effectivity models originate from social choice theory [1,25,32].
More recently, they gained attention as models of ability in agent systems [27,28]. On
the other hand, multi-agent systems are often modeled by various kinds of transition sys-
tems [6,17,21,27] that bear close resemblance to models of multi-step and repeated games
from game theory.Multi-player gamemodels (a.k.a. concurrent game structures) are themost
typical example here.
Correspondence between “concrete” and “abstract” models of strategic power has been
studied in a number of previous works. Characterizations of effectivity in simple cooperative
games (voting games) were investigated e.g. in [25,34]. Peleg and others characterized effec-
tivity patterns arising in surjective normal form game frames [9,31]. Pauly extended Peleg’s
result to general normal form game frames, and provided a logical axiomatization of effec-
tivity in such frames [27,28]. In our previous work, we pointed out that Pauly’s result was in
fact incorrect, and gave the correct characterization of the correspondence, both in structural
and logical terms [19]. All the above results refer to one-shot games (either cooperative or
noncooperative) where strategies are atomic.
While most models of multi-agent interaction are based on transition systems that resem-
ble normal and/or extensive game frames, there is a smaller group of models that come
closer to effectivity functions. In fact, alternating transition systems (ATS) from [5] can be
seen as a special case of coalitional effectivity models where the aggregation of individual
into coalitional power is additive. The correspondence between ATS and multi-player game
models was studied in [16,17]. Another class of effectivity-like models is provided by stit,
i.e., the logic of “seeing to it that” [7]. Models of “strategic stit” [8,11,20,23] are especially
relevant here. In classical stit models [8,23], choices are primitive objects rather than sets
of paths (which in turn are sequences of states constructed by discrete transitions). Still, in
the more computation-friendly approaches to stit, choices can be directly mapped to infinite
sequences of time moments [11,20,22], so they come very close to the effectivity patterns
studied in this paper. Depending on the interpretation, they can be seen as classes of path
effectivity functions or state effectivity functions. However, not all effectivity patterns can
be represented by stit models. Moreover, some of the patterns that can be represented are
not “playable”, i.e., they cannot be obtained in natural multi-step games. We investigate the
relationship between stit models and effectivity models in more detail in Sect. 6.2. It is worth
noting that, to our best knowledge, this is the first formal study of the modeling limitations
of stit. Some simulation results connect stit structures to multi-player game models [11] but
they focus on their logical rather than structural properties.
This article builds on the preliminary research reported in [18].
Structure of the paper The paper is structured as follows. We begin by introducing the
basic notions in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we develop state-based effectivity models that suffice
to define semantics of ATL. The models include three different effectivity functions, one
for each basic modality X,G,U. Then, in Sect. 4 we develop and study effectivity models
based on paths. We show how they provide semantics to ATL*, and identify appropriate
“playability” conditions, which we use to establish correspondences between powers of
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coalitions in the abstract models and strategic abilities of coalitions in concurrent game
models. Finally, in Sect. 6 we briefly discuss how the path-oriented view can be used to
construct an alternative definition of state effectivity, and to facilitate reasoning about games
with imperfect information.Moreover, we show an application of our characterization results
to the well-known stit models of agency.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some basic game-theoretic and logical notions. In all definitions
hereafter, the sets of players, game (outcome) states, and actions available to players are
assumed non-empty. Moreover, the set of players is always assumed finite.
2.1 Concurrent game structures and models
Strategic games (a.k.a. normal form games) are basic models of non-cooperative game the-
ory [26]. Following the tradition in the qualitative study of games, we focus on abstract game
modes, where the effect of strategic interaction between players is represented by abstract
outcomes from a given set, and players’ preferences are not specified.
Definition 1 (Strategic game) A strategic game is a tuple
G = (Agt, St, {Acti |i ∈ Agt}, o)
consisting of a set of players (agents) Agt, a set of outcome states St , a set of actions (atomic
strategies) Acti for each player i ∈ Agt, and an outcome function o : ∏i∈Agt Acti → St
which associates an outcome with every action profile.
We define coalitional strategies αC in G as tuples of individual strategies αi for i ∈ C ,
i.e., ActC = ∏i∈C Acti .
Strategic games are one-step encounters. They can be generalized to multi-step scenarios,
in which every state is associated with a strategic game, as follows.
Definition 2 (Concurrent game structures and models) A concurrent game structure (CGS)
(aka multi-player game frame [16,29]) is a tuple
F = (Agt, St, Act, d, o)
which consists of a set of players Agt = {1, . . . , k}, a set of states St , a set of (atomic) actions
Act , a function d : Agt × St → P(Act) that assigns a sets of actions available to players
at each state, and a deterministic transition function o that assigns a unique outcome state
o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to every starting state q and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉, αi ∈ d(i, q),
that can be executed by Agt in q .
A concurrent game model (CGM) M is a CGS endowed with a valuation V : St →
P(Prop) for some fixed set of atomic propositions Prop.
Note that in a CGS all players execute their actions synchronously and the combination
of the actions, together with the current state, determines the transition in the CGS. We also
observe that a CGS can be seen as a collection of strategic games, each assigned to a different
state in the CGS.
Example 1 (Amodel of aggressive play) Consider two agents interacting in a common envi-
ronment, for instance marketing similar products, building up reputation in a social network,
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Fig. 1 Aggressive vs. conservative play: concurrent game model M1
or playing the same strategic online game. At any moment, each of them can choose to play
aggressively (aggr ) or conservatively (cons). It is well known that in many games (economic
as well as recreational) playing aggressively against a conservative opponent is risky but—if
lucky—it can also bring higher profits. Thus, it is usually advisable to play aggressively when
one’s situation is relatively bad. If the player’s position is strong, conservative play is usually
a better choice.
A very simple model of the scenario is presented in Fig. 1. Propositions good1 (resp.
good2) label states where player 1’s (resp. 2’s) situation is good. Of course, the CGM is
not meant as a serious formalization of aggressive and conservative play. We will only need
it to demonstrate how coalitional effectivity arises in multi-player games with long-term
interaction.
Strategies in multi-step games A path in a CGS/CGM is an infinite sequence of states that can
result from subsequent transitions in the structure. A strategy of a player a in a CGS/CGMM
is a conditional plan that specifies what a should do in each possible situation. Depending on
the type of memory that we assume for the players, a strategy can range from a memoryless
(positional), formally represented with a function sa : St → Act , such that sa(q) ∈ da(q), to
a perfect recall strategy, represented with a function sa : St+ → Act such that sa(〈. . . , q〉) ∈
da(q), where St+ is the set of histories, i.e., finite prefixes of paths in M [6,33]. The latter
corresponds to players with perfect recall of the past states; the former to players whose
memory is entirely encoded in the state of the system. A collective strategy for a group of
playersC = {a1, ..., ar } is simply a tuple of strategies sC = 〈sa1 , ..., sar 〉, one for each player
from C . We denote player a’s component of the collective strategy sC by sC [a].
We define the function out (q, sC ) to return the set of all paths λ ∈ Stω that can be realised
when the players in C follow the strategy sC from state q onward. Formally, for memoryless
strategies, it can be defined as below:
out (q, sC ) = {λ = q0, q1, q2 . . . | q0 = q and for each i = 0, 1, . . . there exists
〈αia1 , . . . , αiak 〉 such that αia ∈ da(qi ) for every a ∈ Agt, αia = sC [a](qi ) for every a ∈ C
and qi+1 = o(qi , αia1 , . . . , αiak )}.
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The definition for perfect recall strategies is analogous:
out (q, sC ) = {λ = q0, q1, q2 . . . | q0 = q and for each i = 0, 1, . . . there exists
〈αia1 , . . . , αiak 〉 such that αia ∈ da(qi ) for every a ∈ Agt, αia = sC [a](〈q0 . . . , qi 〉) for
every a ∈ C and qi+1 = o(qi , αia1 , . . . , αiak )}.
2.2 Abstract models of coalitional effectivity
Definition 3 (Effectivity functions and models) A local effectivity function E : P(Agt) →
P(St) associates a family of sets of stateswith each set of players. A global effectivity function
E : St × P(Agt) → P(P(St)) assigns a local effectivity function to every state q ∈ St . We
will use the notations E(q)(C) and Eq(C) interchangeably.
Finally, a coalitional effectivity model consists of a global effectivity function, plus a
valuation of atomic propositions.
Intuitively, the elements of E(C) correspond to choices of collective actions available to
the coalition C : if X ∈ E(C) then by choosing
X the coalition C can force the outcome of the game to be in X . Hereafter, the elements
of E(C) will be called (collective) action choices of the coalition C . The idea to represent
a choice (of a collective action) of a coalition by the set of possible outcomes which can be
effected by that choice was also captured by the notions of “coalition effectivity models” [27]
and “alternating transition systems” [4].
Definition 4 (True playability [19,27]) A local effectivity function E is truly playable iff
the following hold:
Outcome Monotonicity: X ∈ E(C) and X ⊆ Y implies Y ∈ E(C);
Liveness: ∅ /∈ E(C);
Safety: St ∈ E(C);
Superadditivity: if C ∩ D = ∅, X ∈ E(C) and Y ∈ E(D), then X ∩ Y ∈ E(C ∪ D);
Agt-Maximality: X /∈ E(∅) implies X ∈ E(Agt);
Determinacy: if X ∈ E(Agt) then {x} ∈ E(Agt) for some x ∈ X .
A global effectivity function is truly playable iff it consists only of local functions that are
truly playable.
α-EffectivityEach strategic gameG can be canonically associatedwith an effectivity function,
called the α-effectivity function of G and denoted with EαG [27].
Definition 5 (α-effectivity in strategic games) For a strategic game G, the (coalitional) α-
effectivity function EαG : P(Agt) → P(P(St)) is defined as follows: X ∈ EαG(C) if and only
if there exists σC such that for all σC we have o(σC , σC ) ∈ X .
Example 2 The α-effectivity for M1, q0 is:
E({1, 2}) = {{q0}, {q1}, {q2}, {q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q1, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}};
E({1}) = E({2}) = {{q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}};
E(∅) = {{q0, q1, q2}}.
Clearly, E is truly playable.
Theorem 1 (Representation Theorem [19,27,30]) A local effectivity function E is truly
playable if and only if there exists a strategic game G such that EαG = E.
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2.3 Logical reasoning about multi-step games
TheAlternating-time Temporal Logic ATL* [4,6] is a multimodal logic with strategic modal-
ities 〈〈C〉〉 and temporal operators X (“at the next state”), G (“always from now on”), and U
(“until”).
There are two types of formulae of ATL*, state formulae and path formulae, respectively
defined by the following grammar:
ϕ:: = p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉γ,
γ :: =ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | Xγ | Gγ | γUγ,
for C ⊆ Agt,p ∈ Prop. Temporal operator F (“sometime in the future”) can be defined as
Fϕ ≡ Uϕ.
Let M be a CGM, q a state in M , and λ = q0, q1, . . . a path in M . For every i ∈ N we
denote λ[i] = qi ; λ[0..i] is the prefix q0, q1, . . . , qi , and λ[i..∞] is the respective suffix of
λ.
The semantics of ATL* is given by the following clauses [6]:
M, q | p iff q ∈ V (p), for p ∈ Prop;
M, q | ¬ϕ iff M, q | ϕ;
M, q | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, q | ϕ1 and M, q | ϕ2;
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sC for the players in C such that for each path
λ ∈ out (q, sC ) we have M, λ | γ .
M, λ | ϕ iff M, λ[0] | ϕ;
M, λ | ¬γ iff M, λ | γ ;
M, λ | γ1 ∧ γ2 iff M, λ | γ1 and M, λ | γ2;
M, λ | Xγ iff M, λ[1,∞] | γ ;
M, λ | Gγ iff M, λ[i,∞] | γ for every i ≥ 0; and
M, λ | γ1Uγ2 iff there is i such that M, λ[i,∞] | γ2 and M, λ[ j,∞] | γ1 for all
0 ≤ j < i .
Example 3 Consider again the model of aggressive vs. conservative play from Fig. 1. No
player has a sure strategy to reach a good position in the game if they start from a bad
position. That is, M1, q2 | ¬〈〈1〉〉F good1 and M1, q1 | ¬〈〈2〉〉F good2. Also, no player
can ensure that the other player will eventually be at disadvantage: M1, q | ¬〈〈1〉〉F¬good2
and M1, q | ¬〈〈2〉〉F¬good1 for all states q . On the other hand, if the player’s initial position
is good, she can keep being well off forever (e.g., M1, q0 | 〈〈1〉〉G good1); the right strategy
is to always play conservatively. Moreover, when both players are in a good position, each
of them can maintain the good position of the other one in the next moment (by playing
aggressively): M1, q0 | 〈〈1〉〉X good2 and M1, q0 | 〈〈2〉〉X good1. Finally, if the players
cooperate then they control the game completely: we have M1, q | 〈〈1, 2〉〉X(good1 ∧
good2) ∧ 〈〈1, 2〉〉X(good1 ∧ ¬good2) ∧ 〈〈1, 2〉〉X(¬good1 ∧ good2) for all states q .
ATL and CL as fragments of ATL* The most important fragment of ATL* is ATL where each
strategic modality is directly followed by a single temporal operator. Thus, the semantics of
ATL can be given entirely in terms of states, cf. [6] for details. Consequently, for ATL the
two notions of strategy (memoryless vs. perfect recall) yield the same semantics.
Furthermore, the Coalition Logic (CL) from [27] can be seen as the fragment of ATL
involving only booleans and operators 〈〈C〉〉X, and thus it inherits the semantics of ATL on
CGMs [16].
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3 State effectivity in multi-step games
An alternative semantics of CL was given in [27] in terms of the effectivity models defined
in Sect. 2.2, via the following clause:
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉Xϕ iff ϕM ∈ Eq(C), where ϕM := {s ∈ St | M, s | ϕ}.
It is easy to see that the CGM-based and the effectivity-based semantics of CL coincide
on truly playable models.
The semantics of ATL has never been explicitly defined in terms of abstract effectiv-
ity models. An informal outline of such semantics has been suggested in [17], essentially
by representation of the modalities 〈〈C〉〉G and 〈〈C〉〉U as appropriate fixpoints of 〈〈C〉〉X,
cf. also [6,16]. In this section, we properly extend state-based effectivity models to provide
semantics for ATL. For that, as pointed out earlier, a different effectivity function will be
needed for each temporal pattern.
We note that an effectivity function for the “always” modality G was already constructed
in [27]. Moreover, an effectivity function for reachability, i.e. for the F modality, has recently
been presented in [3]. Our construction here is algebraic and differs significantly from both
these approaches. Moreover, it allows to cover all kinds of effectivity that can be addressed
in ATL (though not in ATL*!).
3.1 Operations on state effectivity functions
First, we define basic operations and relations on effectivity functions, reflecting the meaning
of these as operations on games.
Definition 6 (Operations and relations on effectivity functions) Let E, F : St × P(Agt) →
P(P(St)) be effectivity functions for the set of agents Agt on a state space St. Then:
– Composition of the effectivity functions E, F is the effectivity function E ◦ F where, for
all q ∈ St , Y ⊆ St and C ∈ P(Agt), it holds that Y ∈ (E ◦ F)q(C) iff there exists a
subset Z of St , such that Z ∈ Eq(C) and Y ∈ Fz(C) for every z ∈ Z .
– Union of the effectivity functions E, F is the effectivity function E ∪ F where, for all
q ∈ St , Y ⊆ St and C ∈ P(Agt), it holds that Y ∈ (E ∪ F)q(C) iff Y ∈ Eq(C) or
Y ∈ Fq(C).
– Intersection of effectivity functions is defined analogously. Likewise, we define union
and intersection of any family of effectivity functions. For instance, given a family of





such that Y ∈ Eq(C) iff there exists a j ∈ J such that Y ∈ E jq (C), for all q ∈ St , Y ⊆ St
and C ∈ P(Agt).
– Inclusion of effectivity functions:
E ⊆ F iff Eq(C) ⊆ Fq(C) for every q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt.
– Lastly, the idle effectivity function I is defined as follows:
Iq(C) = {Y ⊆ St | q ∈ Y } for every q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt.
Hereafter, we assume that ◦ has a stronger binding power than ∪ and ∩.
Proposition 1 The following hold for any outcome monotone effectivity functions E, F,G :
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1. E ◦ I = I ◦ E = E .
2. If F1 ⊆ F2 then E ◦ F1 ⊆ E ◦ F2.
3. (E ∪ F) ◦ G = (E ◦ G) ∪ (E ◦ F).
4. (E ∩ F) ◦ G = (E ◦ G) ∩ (E ◦ F).
Proof Routine. unionsq
Remark 1
1. We note that, e.g., item 2 in Proposition 1, does not require the effectivity function to be
outcome monotone. However, we will only apply this proposition to outcome monotone
effectivity functions, so the monotonicity assumption is unproblematic.
2. The identities E ◦ (F∪G) = (E ◦ F) ∪ (E ◦ G) and E ◦ (F ∩G) = (E ◦ F) ∩ (E ◦ G)
are not valid.However, byProposition1.1, the inclusions E ◦ (F∪G)⊇(E◦F) ∪ (E ◦ G)
and E ◦ (F ∩ G)⊆(E ◦ F) ∩ (E ◦ G) hold.
Definition 7 For any effectivity function E we define inductively the effectivity functions
E (n) and E [n] as follows:
E (0) = I , E (n+1) = I ∪ E ◦ E (n),
E [0] = I , E [n+1] = I ∩ E ◦ E [n].
Proposition 2 For every n ≥ 0 : E (n) ⊆ E (n+1) and E [n+1] ⊆ E [n].
Proof Routine, by induction on n. unionsq
Definition 8 Given an effectivity function E : St×P(Agt) → P(P(St)), theweak iteration
of E is the function E (∗) =
∞⋃
k=0
E (k), i.e., Y ∈ E (∗)q (C) iff ∃n. Y ∈ E (n)q (C).




i.e., Y ∈ E [∗]q (C) iff ∀n. Y ∈ E [n]q (C).
Proposition 3 Unions, intersections, compositions, week and strong iterations preserve
outcome-monotonicity of effectivity functions.
Proof Routine. unionsq
Proposition 4 For any finite state space St and effectivity function E in it:
1. E (∗) is the least fixed point of the monotone operator Fw defined by Fw(F) = I ∪ E ◦ F.
2. E [∗] is the greatest fixed point of themonotone operatorFq defined byFq(F) = I∩E◦F.
Proof (1) First, we show by induction on k that for every k, E (k) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E (∗). Indeed,
E (0) = I ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E (∗); E (k+1) = I ∪ E ◦ E (k) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E (∗) by the inductive hypothesis
and Proposition 1. Thus, E (∗) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ E (∗).
For the converse inclusion, let Y ∈ (I ∪ E ◦ E (∗))q(C). If Y ∈ Iq(C), then Y ∈ E (∗)q by
definition. SupposeY ∈ (E ◦ E (∗))q(C).Then, there is Z ∈ Eq(C) such that for every z ∈ Z ,
Y ∈ E (∗)z(C), hence Y ∈ E (kz)z (C) for some kz ≥ 0. Let m = max
z∈Z kz . Then, by Proposition
2, Y ∈ E (m)z (C) for every z ∈ Z . Therefore, Y ∈ (E ◦ E (m))q(C) ⊆ E (m+1)q (C) ⊆ E (∗)q (C).
Thus, E (∗) is a fixed point of the operator Fw.
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Now, suppose that F is such that Fw(F) = I ∪ E ◦ F. Then, we show by induction on k
that for every k, E (k) ⊆ F. Indeed, E (0) = I ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ F = F. Suppose E (k) ⊆ F. Then
E (k+1) = I ∪ E ◦ E (k) ⊆ I ∪ E ◦ F = F by the inductive hypothesis and Proposition 1.
Thus, E (∗) ⊆ F. Therefore, E (∗) is the least fixed point of Fw.
(2) The argument is dually analogous. unionsq
The proof above only works when the state space St is finite. However, the operators Fw
and Fq are monotone in the general case and the result above suggests that E (∗) and E [∗] can
be defined in general as the respective fixed points.
3.2 Binary effectivity functions
Binary effectivity functions will be used to provide fixed point characterisation and semantics
for the binary temporal connective Until.
Definition 9 Given a set of players Agt and a set of states St , a local binary effectivity
function for Agt on St is a mapping U : P(Agt) → P(P(St) × P(St)) associating with
each set of players a family of pairs of outcome sets.
A global binary effectivity function associates a local binary effectivity function with each
state from St .
Now we define some global binary effectivity functions and operations and relations on
them.
Definition 10
– Left-idle binary effectivity function L : St×P(Agt)→P(P(St)×P(St)), where
Lq(C) = {(X, Y ) | q ∈ X} for any q ∈ St and C ⊆ Agt. Respectively, right-idle
binary effectivity function R is defined by Rq(C) = {(X, Y ) | q ∈ Y } for any q ∈ St
and C ⊆ Agt.
– Union of binary effectivity functions U,W : St × P(Agt) → P(P(St) × P(St)) is the
binary effectivity function U ∪ W where (X, Y ) ∈ (U ∪ W )q(C) iff (X, Y ) ∈ Uq(C) or
(X, Y ) ∈ Vq(C).
– Intersection of binary effectivity functions is defined analogously.
– Right projection ofU is the unary effectivity function E such that Eq(C) = {Y | (X, Y ) ∈
Uq(C) for some X ∈ P(St)}} for all q,C .
– Likewise, we define union, intersection, and right projection of any family of binary
effectivity functions.
– Composition of a unary effectivity function E with a binary effectivity functionU is the
binary effectivity function E ◦U such that (X, Y ) ∈ (E ◦U )q(C) iff there exists a subset
Z of St , such that Z ∈ Eq(C) and (X, Y ) ∈ Uz(C) for every z ∈ Z .
– Inclusion of binary effectivity functions: U ⊆ W iff Uq(C) ⊆ Wq(C) for every q ∈ St
and C ⊆ Agt.
– Binary iteration. For any unary effectivity function E we define the binary effectivity
functions E {n}, n ≥ 0, inductively as follows: E {0} = R; E {n+1} = R ∪ (L ∩ E ◦ E {n}).
Then, the binary iteration of E is defined as the binary effectivity function E {∗} =
∞⋃
k=0
E {k}, i.e. (X, Y ) ∈ E {∗}q (C) iff (X, Y ) ∈ E {n}q (C) for some n.
Definition 11 A binary effectivity function U is outcome-monotone if every Uq(C) is
upwards closed, i e. (X, Y )∈ Uq(C) and X ⊆ X ′, Y ⊆ Y ′ imply (X ′, Y ′)∈ Uq(C).
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Proposition 5 For any finite state space St and unary effectivity function E in it, E {∗} is the
least fixed point of the monotone operator Fb defined by Fb(U ) = R ∪ (L ∩ E ◦U ).
Proof Analogous to the proof of Proposition 4. unionsq
Again, the operator Fb is monotone for any (finite or infinite) state space St and the result
above suggests how E {∗} can be defined in general.
The next result follows immediately from Propositions 3, 4 and 5.
Proposition 6 E (∗), E [∗] and E {∗} are outcome-monotone. Moreover, E (∗) is the right pro-
jection of E {∗}.
3.3 State-based effectivity models for ATL
The semantics of ATL can now be given in terms of models that are more abstract and
technically simpler than CGM.
Definition 12 A state-based effectivity frame (SEF) for ATL is a tuple
F = 〈Agt, St,E,G,U〉
where Agt is a set of players, St is a set of states, E andG are outcome-monotone effectivity
functions, and U is an outcome-monotone binary effectivity function.
A state-based effectivity model (SEM) for ATL is a SEF plus a valuation of atomic propo-
sitions.
That is, an effectivity frame/model forATL includes not one but three effectivity functions:
one for each temporal modality in the language.
Definition 13 A SEF F is standard iff
1. E is truly playable,
2. G = E[∗],
3. U = E{∗}.
A SEM M = 〈F, V 〉 is standard if F is standard.
3.4 State-based effectivity semantics for ATL
Now, we define truth of an ATL formula at a state of a state-based effectivity model uniformly
as follows:
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉Xϕ iff ϕM ∈ Eq(C),
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉Gϕ iff ϕM ∈ Gq(C),
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉ψUϕ iff (ψM, ϕM) ∈ Uq(C).
Extending α-effectivity to SEM Given a CGM M = (Agt, St, Act, d, o, V ), we construct
its corresponding SEM as follows: SEM(M) = (Agt, St,E,G,U) where Eq = EαM,q for all
q ∈ St , G = E[∗], and U = E{∗}.
Example 4 The “always” effectivity in state q0 of the model of aggressive vs. conservative
play from Example 1 can be written as follows:
Gq0(∅) = {{q0, q1, q2}}, Gq0({1}) = Gq0({2}) = {{q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}},
Gq0({1, 2}) = {{q0}, {q0, q1}, {q0, q2}, {q0, q1, q2}}.
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The next result easily follows from Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 (Representation Theorem) A state effectivity model M for ATL is standard iff
there exists a CGM M such that M = SEM(M).
Moreover, we note that theATL semantics in CGMs and in their associated standard SEMs
coincide.
Theorem 3 For every CGM M, state q in M, and ATL formula ϕ, we have that M, q | ϕ
iff SEM(M), q | ϕ.
Proof Routine, by structural induction on formulae. unionsq
Corollary 1 Any ATL formula ϕ is valid (resp., satisfiable) in concurrent game models iff ϕ
is valid (resp., satisfiable) in standard state-based effectivity models.
4 Coalitional path effectivity
State-based effectivity models for ATL partly characterize coalitional powers for achieving
long-term objectives. However, the applicability of such models is limited by the fact that
they characterize effectivity with respect to outcome states, while effectivity for outcome
paths (i.e., plays) is only captured when such paths are described by the specific temporal
patterns definable in ATL. Thus, in particular, state-based effectivity models are not suitable
for providing semantics of the whole ATL*.
In this section we aim at getting to the core of the notion of effectivity in multi-step games,
regardless of the temporal pattern that defines thewinning condition, by re-defining it in terms
of outcome paths, rather than states. The idea is natural: every collective strategy of the grand
coalition in a multi-step game determines a unique path (play) through the state space of the
game. Consequently, the outcome of following an individual or coalitional strategy in such
game is a set of paths (plays) that can result from execution of the strategy, depending on the
moves of the remaining players. Hence, powers of players and coalitions in multi-step games
can be characterized by sets of sets of paths. Our main conceptual motivation is precisely
that a strategy of a player, or a collective strategy of a coalition, determines a set of paths
(plays), not states, which can be effected by such strategy. Viewing outcomes of a strategy as
infinite paths seems appropriate for reasoning about repeated (or extensive) games that run
in infinitely many steps.
We also claim that the notion of path effectivity captures adequately the meaning of
strategic operators in ATL(*). Moreover, it provides correct semantics for the whole ATL*,
and not only its limited fragment ATL.
4.1 Path effectivity functions, frames and models
Definition 14 (Path effectivity function) Let Agt be a set of players, and St a set of states. A
path in St is an infinite sequence of states, i.e., an element of Stω. A path effectivity function
is a mapping E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) that assigns to each coalition a non-empty family
of sets of paths.
The intuition is analogous to that for state effectivity: the inclusion of a set of paths X in
E(C)means that the coalitionC can choose a strategy that ensures that the game will develop
along one of the paths in X .
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Note that the definition above refers to global effectivity, in the sense that X ∈ E(C)
can (in fact, must) include paths starting from different states. Local path effectivity (for
each initial state separately) is easily extractable from the global one. This is in line with the
concept of a strategy as a complete conditional plan: in particular, the strategy must prescribe
collective actions of the coalition from all possible initial states of the game.
By analogy with identifying action choices as sets of outcome states in state effectivity
models, we refer to the elements of E(C) for a path effectivity function E as (global) strategic
choices of the coalition C . The intuition is that every strategic choice F ∈ E(C) is the sets of
paths in St that C can enforce when playing the chosen collective strategy represented by F .
Note that not every sequence of states is a feasible path in a given concrete model (i.e, a
CGM), but only those that follow the transitions in the model. Likewise, for an abstract path
effectivity function E , it is not required that all the sequences of states appear in E . We define







that is, PathsE is the set of paths appearing in any choice from E . For the set PathsE defined
this way, we will sometimes say that E is an effectivity function over the set of feasible paths
PathsE .
Hereafter, we will assume that E captures the outcome monotone effectivity, i.e., it collects
the actual outcome paths of choices available to C , and then it takes all their supersets, i.e.,
closes under upwards monotonicity.
Definition 15 (Path effectivity frames/models) A path effectivity frame (PEF) is a structure
F = (Agt, St, E) consisting of a set of players Agt, a set of states St and a path effectivity
function E on these. A path effectivity model (PEM) M expands a PEF with a valuation of
the propositions V : Prop → P(St).
Notation Clearly, not every path effectivity frame corresponds to a concrete game structure.
To capture “playability” conditions for path effectivity functions and frames, we will need
some additional notation. Let q ∈ St , h, h′ ∈ St+, X ∈ P(Stω), and E be a path effectivity
function. We define the following:
h  h′ if h′ is an extension of h;
X [i] := {λ[i] | λ ∈ X } collects states that appear on the i th position of paths in X ;
X (q) := {λ ∈ X | λ[0] = q} selects the paths in X starting from q;
X (h) := {λ | λ∈X , and λ[0..k] = h for some k} is the set of paths in X starting with h;
X |h := {λ[k..∞] | λ∈X and λ[0..k] = h} is the set of suffixes of paths in X , extending
h;
Consequently, for sets of sets of paths:
E(C)(q) = {X (q) | X ∈ E(C)},
E(C)(h) = {X (h) | X ∈ E(C)},
E(C)|h = {X |h | X ∈ E(C)}.
To make the text easier to read, we will typically use X, Y, . . . for state choices, and
X ,Y, . . . for path choices. Moreover, we will use E to denote state effectivity functions, and
E for path effectivity functions.
The initial segments λ[0..k] of feasible paths of a path effectivity function E will be called
(initial) feasible histories of E .
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4.2 Generating state effectivity from path effectivity functions and vice versa
We will now define two natural mappings between path and state effectivity functions. First,
a path effectivity function can be transformed into a state effectivity function by extracting
from paths their initial segments (the “openingmoves”). Secondly, a state effectivity function
can be transformed into a path effectivity function by “unfolding” all possible paths that arise
from a given subset of state transitions.
Definition 16 (State projection) The (successor) state projection of a global strategic choice
X ⊆ Stω is the mapping X S : St → P(St), called the (global) action choice corresponding
to X , defined as follows:
X S(q) = {λ[1] | λ ∈ X and λ[0] = q}.
Similarly, the state projection of a path effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Paths))
is the global state effectivity function E S : St × P(Agt) → P(P(St)) that assigns to every
C ⊆ Agt and q ∈ St the family
E S(C)(q) = {X S(q) | X ∈ E(C)(q)}
of sets of successor states, one for each set of paths in E(C)(q).
X S(q) includes all the states that are immediate successors of q at the beginning
of a path in X . Thus, X S assigns possible successors to each state, so it can be seen as
a representation of a possible transition relation between states in St . Moreover, E S collects
all such transition relations that “approximate” the choices available in E .
We note that if a global strategic choice X is suffix closed, i.e., contains all paths λ[i..∞]
for every path λ ∈ X , then the definition of state projection of X is equivalent to
X S(q) = {λ[i + 1] | λ ∈ X , i ∈ N and λ[i] = q}.
That is, we can as well see the state choices in X S(q) as collecting the successors of q
on any path passing through q . A global action choice can be also defined abstractly, rather
than derived from a global strategic choice, as a mapping X : St → P(St). It may, but need
not, correspond to a family of collective actions, one at each state, for a given coalition. The
next definition describes how a global action choice generates a subset of paths.
Definition 17 (Path closure) Given a global action choice X : St → P(St), we define its
path closure X P ⊆ Stω as follows:
X P = {λ | λ[i + 1] ∈ X (λ[i]) for all i ≥ 0}.
Likewise, the path closure of a global state effectivity function E : St × P(Agt) →






EP (C) = {X ⊆ PathsEP | X P ⊆ X for some X ∈ E(C)
}
.
where by X ∈ E(C) we mean X (q) ∈ Eq(C) for every q ∈ St .
That is, X P collects the paths generated by the transition function represented by X .
Moreover, EP is the outcome-monotone closure of the family of strategic choices generated
this way from the state effectivity function E .
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4.3 Path effectivity in concurrent game structures
In this section, we propose an analogue of α-effectivity from Sect. 2.2 for distilling abstract
path effectivity from CGM’s. Not every set of feasible paths in a CGM is a feasible choice
for a coalition, and the powers of players and coalitions in a game crucially depend on their
available strategies. There are different notions of strategy, e.g., depending on the amount of
memory that the players can use.Wewill parameterize our concept of effectivity inmulti-step
games with a type (class) of strategies. Two types of strategies were already introduced in
Sect. 2.1, namely deterministic memoryless and deterministic perfect recall strategies, and
we will focus on these classes henceforth. However, one can easily imagine other types of
strategies, such as bounded memory strategies, finite memory strategies, nondeterministic
strategies, and so on. Our concept of effectivity in multi-step games is well defined for all
these classes, under the mild conditions set out below.
Definition 18 (Normal class of strategies) A class Σ of individual and coalitional strategies
is normal iff:
1. Every player has at least one strategy in Σ ,
2. Coalitional strategies are obtained by freely combining the individual strategies of the
participating players,3 and
3. No strategy in Σ (individual or coalitional) ever yields an empty set of successor states.
It is easy to see that the classes of perfect recall and memoryless strategies from Sect. 2.1
are normal. We will refer to them with FulMem and NoMem, respectively.
For a CGM M , by PathsM we denote the set of all paths feasible in M , that is, the set
of infinite sequences of states that can be obtained by subsequent transitions in M . We leave
out the details of the formal definition.
Definition 19 (Σ-effectivity) Let M be a CGM and Σ = ⋃C⊆Agt ΣC be a normal set of





X ⊆ PathsM |
⋃
q∈St





Specifically, we denote by EFulMemM and ENoMemM the effectivity of coalitions respectively
for perfect recall strategies and for memoryless strategies in M .
Example 5 The difference between perfect recall and memoryless effectivity is most easily
seen in the case of the grand coalition. For instance, in the model of aggressive vs. conserva-
tive play from Example 1, EFulMemM ({1, 2}) is the outcome-monotone closure of the family{{λ0, λ1, λ2} | λ ∈ {q0, q1, q2}ω, λi [0] = qi }, i.e.:
EFulMemM ({1, 2}) = {X ⊆ {q0, q1, q2}ω | X (q) = ∅ for every q ∈ {q0, q1, q2}}.
In contrast, ENoMemM ({1, 2}) is the outcome-monotone closure of the family containing
sets {λ0, λ1, λ2} such that: each λi ∈ {q0, q1, q2}ω, λi [0] = qi , and moreover each of
λ0, λ1, λ2 is of the form: (qi )ω, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, or qi (q j )ω, i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, or (qiq j )ω, i, j ∈
3 Here we adhere to the assumption that the available strategies of one member in a coalition is independent
of the actual choices of the other members.
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{0, 1, 2}, or qiq j (qk)ω, i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i = j , or qi (q jqk)ω, i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i = j , or
(qiq jqk)ω, i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i = j , which reduces to:
ENoMemM ({1, 2}) = {X ⊆ {q0, q1, q2}ω | ∀q ∈ {q0, q1, q2} .
qiq j (qk)
ω ∈ X (q) for some qi , q j , qk, i = j,
or qi (q jqk)
ω ∈ X (q) for i = j or j = k,
or (qiq jqk)
ω ∈ X (q) for i = j}.
That is, the players can enforce any sequence of states when they have perfect memory,
but in the memoryless case they can only enforce the “periodic” paths that fall into a loop
as soon as they revisit the same state. It is interesting to note that EFulMemM ({1, 2}) contains
uncountably many elements (choice sets), whereas ENoMemM ({1, 2}) is countable.
Below we collect some observations that will be used further.
Proposition 7 For every CGM M and a normal class Σ of coalitional strategies in M :
1. Every coalition has a collective strategy, and therefore for every state q in M it can
enforce at least one set of outcome paths starting from q. (Safety)
2. For any coalition C and state q in M, every coalitional strategy produces a non-empty
set of outcome paths starting from q. (Liveness)
3. All the supersets of a choice in EΣM (C) belong to EΣM (C), too. (Outcome-Monotonicity)
4. EΣM (∅) is a singleton. More precisely, EΣM (∅) = {PathsM }.
5. Every two disjoint coalitions can join their chosen coalitional strategies to enforce the
intersection of the outcome paths enforced by each of the coalitions following its respec-
tive strategy. Together with outcome-monotonicity, this implies that, if C ∩ D = ∅,
X ∈ EΣM (C), and Y ∈ EΣM (D), then X ∩ Y ∈ EΣM (C ∪ D). (Superadditivity)
Moreover, for Σ = FulMem and Σ = NoMem, we have the following:
6. EΣM (Agt) is the outcome-monotone closure of the family of all the sets of paths that contain
a path from PathsM starting from each initial state. Consequently, EΣM (Agt) = {X ⊆
PathsM | X (q) = ∅ for every q ∈ St}. (Determinacy)
Proof Straightforward. unionsq
4.4 Path effectivity semantics of ATL*
Given an ATL* path formula γ and a path effectivity model M, let
γ M = {λ ∈ PathsM | M, λ | γ } .
denote the set of paths in M that satisfy γ . Note that the relation M, λ | γ is already well
defined by the relevant semantic clauses in Sect. 2.3 (it is essentially the semantics of Linear
Time Logic LTL). Then, the path effectivity semantics of ATL* in strategies Σ is given by
the clause below:
M, q |Σ 〈〈C〉〉γ iff γ M(q) ∈ E(C)(q).
We observe that the above clause interprets ATL* modalities as CL modalities over out-
come paths. Moreover, using path effectivity functions brings technical simplicity: only one
effectivity function is needed to completely describe the power of coalitions. Last but not
least, only one semantic clause is needed to define strategic ability in ATL*. The temporal
patterns (that, in a sense, serve as winning conditions) are appropriately handled by LTL
semantics.
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Example 6 Let us apply the path effectivity semantics of ATL* to our model of aggres-
sive vs. conservative play M1 from Fig. 1. Analogously to the standard semantics, we have
EFulMemM1 , q0 | 〈〈1, 2〉〉Fposi and ENoMemM1 , q0 | 〈〈1, 2〉〉Fposi for every i = 0, 1, 2. This
can be demonstrated e.g. by the choice {q0(qi )ω} that belongs to EFulMemM1 ({1, 2}) as well as
ENoMemM1 ({1, 2}).
5 Characterizing path effectivity functions
The path effectivity semantics for ATL* defined above is very general, and allows for rea-
soning about quite abstract—one may even say contrived—patterns of effectivity. Here we
identify the characteristic properties of path effectivity functions arising in CGSs, and define
an analogue of the notion of (truly) playable state effectivity functions.We begin with generic
conditions that must apply to any pattern of effectivity, regardless of the type of strategies
being used. Then, we proceed to characterize additional conditions that are necessary (and
sufficient) in the special cases of memoryless and perfect recall strategies.
5.1 General playability conditions
Definition 20 (Playability in path effectivity) Let Paths ⊆ Stω. A path effectivity function
E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) is truly playable over the set of feasible paths Paths if it satisfies
the following conditions:
P-Safety: E(C)(q) is non-empty for every C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St .
P-Liveness: ∅ /∈ E(C)(q) for every C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St .
P-Outcome Monotonicity: For every C ⊆ Agt the set E(C) is upwards closed: if X ∈
E(C) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ Paths then Y ∈ E(C).
P-Superadditivity: For every C, D ⊆ Agt, if C ∩ D = ∅, X ∈ E(C) and Y ∈ E(D), then
X ∩ Y ∈ E(C ∪ D).
P-∅-Minimality: E(∅) is the singleton {Paths}.
P-Determinacy: For every q ∈ St , if X ∈ E(Agt) then {λ} ∈ E(Agt)(q) for some
λ ∈ X (q).4
We note that the playability conditions above are variants of true playability for path-based
effectivity.
Proposition 8 True playability carries over between corresponding path and state effectivity
functions. More precisely, let Paths ⊆ Stω be such that (PathsS)P = Paths.5 Then:
1. If the path effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) is truly playable over Paths
then its state projection E S is truly playable, too.
2. If the state effectivity function E : St × P(Agt) → P(P(St)) is truly playable then its
path closure E P is truly playable over Paths.
Proof Checking the respective playability conditions is straightforward, and we leave it to
the interested reader. unionsq
4 Note that, unlike in the case of state effectivity functions where the determinacy constraint is only needed
for infinite state games (cf. [19]), it becomes essential here, because even very simple 2-state structures can
generate uncountably many paths.
5 Later we will call such sets of paths state-transition closed, cf. Definition 21.
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Besides the general conditions in Definition 20, we need additional conditions which are
specific to the underlying class of strategies, and relate local choices with global strategies
in path effectivity frames.
5.2 Path effectivity with memoryless strategies
Here wewill obtain an abstract characterization of the path effectivity functions in concurrent
game structures corresponding to memoryless strategies.
5.2.1 Preparation
Definition 21 (State-transition closed choices and effectivity functions) A global choice X
of a path effectivity function E is state-transition closed iff (X S)P = X . That is,X coincides
with the set of paths that follow the state-based transition relation projected from X .
Respectively, E is state-transition closed iff (E S)P = E .
Clearly, every path effectivity function generated bymemoryless strategies of any coalition
C in any CGS is state-transition closed. Moreover, the set of paths in any global choice X
determined by memoryless strategies of a coalition in a CGS M corresponds to the set of
all paths along a transition relation in M , suitably restricted by these memoryless strategies.
By a result of Emerson [15], every such set of paths is precisely characterized by 3 simple
closure conditions, defined below.
Definition 22 (Closure conditions for sets of paths) A set of paths X in a state space St is:
1. suffix closed if every suffix path λ[i..∞] of a path in X belongs to X ;
2. fusion closed if for every λ, λ′ ∈ X such that λ[i] = λ′[0] then the “fusion path” λ′′ such
that λ′′[0..i] = λ[0..i] and λ′′[i..∞] = λ′[i..∞] belongs to X .
3. limit closed if for every path λ, if there is a sequence of paths {λi }i∈N in X such that
λ[0..i] = λi [0..i] for every i ∈ N, then λ belongs to X , too.
We obtain the following characterization of state-transition closed global choices of a path
effectivity function E .
Proposition 9 A global choice X of a path effectivity function E is state-transition closed iff
it is suffix, fusion, and limit closed.
Proof As proved in [15], a set of paths in a state space St is suffix, fusion, and limit closed iff it
is the set of all paths along some transition relation in St . Thus, every state-transition closed
global choice satisfies these closure conditions. Conversely, if a global choice X satisfies
these closure conditions then it is the set of paths generated by some transition relation R
in St . Because of the suffix closure, R is precisely the state projection of X , hence X is
state-transition closed. unionsq
Definition 23 (State-transition closed core of E) The state-transition closed core of a path
effectivity function E is the path effectivity function Ecore that selects only state-transition
closed choices from E , i.e.:
Ecore(C) = {X ∈ E(C) | (X S)P = X }.
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Intuitively, if all players in C are following a collective memoryless strategy, while the
others are free to execute any available actions, then the same set of possible successor states
should be available whenever the system is in state q , regardless of the path that leads to that
state. Ideally, these should be exactly the feasible successors, i.e., ones that can be effected by
a transition consistent with the strategy. Every such “feasible” global choice is by definition
state-transition closed. However, Definition 23 allows also for state-transition closed choices
that properly extend feasible choices by adding superfluous successor states in a uniform
way (that is, the same superfluous successors are added whenever q occurs).
We note in passing that Ecore is never outcome-monotone except in trivial cases, even if
E is.
Lemma 1 Every state-transition closed path effectivity function E is equal to the outcome
monotone closure of its state-transition closed core. Formally, for every coalition C:
E(C) = {X ⊆ Paths | X ⊇ Y ∈ Ecore(C)} .
Proof First, note that the path closure X P of any global action choice X : St → P(St) is
state-transition closed.
Now, let X ∈ E(C). Then, also X ∈ (E S)P (C), and hence there must exist Y ⊆ X such
that Y is the path closure of some global action choice in E S .
Then, Y = (Y S)P , hence Y ∈ Ecore(C). Consequently, X is in the outcome-monotone
closure of Ecore(C). The converse direction is analogous. unionsq
5.2.2 Characterization
Nowwe can proceed with our characterization of path effectivity functions that correspond to
concurrent game structures. We begin with a proposition that characterizes structurally state-
transition closed effectivity functions. Intuitively, NoMem-grounding specifies that every
strategic choice is an outcome-monotone extension of some “internally consistent” (that is,
state-transition closed) choice. Moreover, NoMem-convexity requires that any consistent
collection of “locally applied” strategies for a given coalition C can be pieced together into
a global memoryless strategy for C .
Proposition 10 A path effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) over a set of feasible
paths Paths is state-transition closed iff for every C ⊆ Agt the following two conditions
hold:
(NoMem-Grounding) E(C) is the outcome-monotone closure of Ecore(C), i.e., for every
Y ∈ E(C) there is X ∈ Ecore(C) such that X ⊆ Y .
(NoMem-Convexity) For every family {X q ∈ Ecore(C) | q ∈ St} of state-transition
closed global choices, if Y ∈ E(C) is such that Y(q) = X q(q) for every q ∈ St, then
(Y S)P ∈ Ecore(C).
Equivalently, the NoMem-Convexity condition can be formulated as follows: For every




Proof “⇒”: Let E(C) be state-transition closed. Then, NoMem-Grounding holds by
Lemma 1. Moreover, take any family {X q ∈ Ecore(C) | q ∈ St} of state-transition closed
global choices. For everyq ∈ St , the set of immediate successors of the initial stateq inX q(q)
is in (X q)S . Consider the global action choice Y such that, for every q ∈ St , Y (q) = (X q)S .
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Clearly, Y ∈ E S(C), hence Y P ∈ (E S)P (C). Finally, we observe that Y = (⋃q∈St X q(q)
)S
and (E S)P (C) = E(C) by assumption. Thus, ((⋃q∈St X q(q)
)S)P ∈ E(C). Since that choice
is closed by construction, it must also be in Ecore(C), which concludes this part of the proof.
“⇐”:Let E be NoMem-grounded and NoMem-convex, and let X ∈ E(C). Then, there is
Y ⊆ X which is state-transition closed, byNoMem-Grounding.But then alsoY ∈ (E S)P (C),
hence X ∈ (E S)P (C) because path closure is closed under supersets.
Conversely, let X ∈ (E S)P (C). Then, it is a superset of the path closure of a global action
choice generated from a combination of state projections of strategic choices {X q | q ∈ St} in
E(C).More precisely:X ⊇ ((⋃q∈St X q(q)
)S)P . ByNoMem-grounding, for eachX q , there
must be a state-transition closed strategic choice Yq ∈ Ecore(C) such that Yq ⊆ X q . Now,
take the family {Yq | q ∈ St}. By NoMem-convexity, we get that ((⋃q∈St Yq(q)
)S)P ∈
E(C). Since (i)⋃q∈St Yq(q) ⊆
⋃
q∈St X q(q), (ii) the operations of state projection and path
closure are monotonic wrt sets of outcomes from the effectivity functions, and (iii) E(C) is
closed under supersets, we finally obtain that X ∈ E(C). unionsq
Theorem 4 (NoMem-Representation theorem) A path effectivity function E over a set of
feasible pathsPaths equals the path effectivity function with memoryless strategies ENoMemM
for some concurrent game structure M if and only if Paths is state-transition closed and E
is truly playable and state-transition closed.
Proof By Proposition 10 it suffices to prove that E is representable in concurrent game struc-
tures with memoryless strategies iff Paths is state-transition closed and E is truly playable,
NoMem-grounded, and NoMem-convex.
“⇒”: Take any CGS M and its path effectivity function ENoMemM . State-transition closed-
ness of PathsM is obvious. Further, we observe that ENoMemM is the path closure of the state
α-effectivity function of M , i.e, ENoMemM = (EαM )P . Thus, by Proposition 8(2) ENoMemM
must be truly playable. Therefore, every choice Y ∈ ENoMemM (C) is a superset of some
state-transition closed choice X generated by some collective memoryless strategy of C , and
hence it is also NoMem-grounded. Finally, for a family of state-transition closed choices
{X q | q ∈ St} in ENoMemM (C), let us take X̂ q ⊆ X q to be a choice generated by an actual
collective strategy of C (it must exist by construction of ENoMemM ). Let Y =
⋃
q∈St X q(q)
and Ŷ = ⋃q∈St X̂ q(q). Clearly, Ŷ is the set of paths generated by a collective strategy of
C that combines the opening moves from {X̂ q}. In consequence, Ŷ ∈ ENoMemM (C). More-
over, Ŷ ⊆ Y , so Y ∈ ENoMemM (C) by the outcome-monotonicity of ENoMemM . That proves
NoMem-convexity.
“⇐”: Let E be truly playable, NoMem-grounded, and NoMem-convex over a state-
transition closed set of feasible paths Paths. Then:
1. We construct the global state effectivity function E S as the state projection of E (Defini-
tion 16). By Proposition 8(1), E S is truly playable.
2. Using the representation theorem in [19] we construct a CGS M for the same set of agents
Agt and state space St , such that the state effectivity function EαM of M coincides with
E S .
3. Using EαM we construct the respective path effectivity function ENoMemM as the path
closure of EαM , according to Definition 17.
4. Finally, we show that ENoMemM coincides with E by using the NoMem-grounding and
NoMem-convexity of each of E and ENoMemM . For that we fix any coalition C and prove
both inclusions:
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– E(C) ⊆ ENoMemM (C): Take any global choiceY ∈ E(C). Then there isX ∈ Ecore(C)
such that X ⊆ Y (by Grounding). The state projection X S in E S is a global action
choice in E S(C) = EαM (C). Thus, there is a collective memoryless strategy σC for
C in M that generates an actual global action choice X̂ ∈ EαM (C) of which X S is an
extension (i.e., X̂(q) ⊆ X S(q) for every q ∈ St). Clearly, the path closure of X̂ cor-
responds to the set of actual outcome paths of σC , therefore X̂ P ∈ ENoMemM (C). By
monotonicity of path closure,we also have that X̂ P ⊆ (X S)P .Moreover, (X S)P = X
because X is state-transition closed. Thus, Y ⊇ X ⊇ X̂ ∈ ENoMemM (C), and hence
Y ∈ ENoMemM (C) by the outcome-monotonicity of ENoMemM (C).
– ENoMemM (C) ⊆ E(C): Take any global choice Y ∈ ENoMemM (C). By construction
of ENoMemM , there must a global state choice X ∈ EαM (C), hence X ∈ E S(C) (by
point 5.2.2 above), that corresponds to an actual collective strategy of C in M and Y
extends the set of paths generated by X (that is, X P ⊆ Y). By the definition of state
projection, there must be a strategic choice X̂ ∈ E(C) such that X (q) = {q ′ | λ[0] =
q and λ[1] = q ′ for some λ ∈ X̂ } for every q ∈ St . Moreover, by the NoMem-
groundedness of E , we have that for every q there is a state-transition closedX q such
that X q(q) ⊆ X̂ (q). Take Ŷ = ((⋃q∈St X q(q)
)S)P . By NoMem-convexity of E ,
we have that Ŷ ∈ E(C). Summarizing, we have Y ⊇ X P = ((⋃q∈St X q(q)
)S)P =
Ŷ ∈ E(C). Thus, by the outcome-monotonicity of E , we obtain that Y ∈ E(C).
5.3 Path effectivity with perfect recall strategies
Our characterization of representability for perfect recall strategies is analogous, but now
the requirements on a valid strategy are more relaxed. As a consequence, more sets of paths
(strategic choices) in a path effectivity function correspond to actual strategies in the CGS.
In fact, every sequence of collective actions at the states of an infinite play by a group of
agents can be regarded as determined by a perfect recall strategy of that group. The difference
from the case of memoryless strategies is that every passing through the same state allows
a different choice and hence determines a possibly different set of successor states. That
difference can be captured in two different, but equivalent ways: by associating not state-
based, but history-based effectivity functions, or by considering state effectivity functions
andmemoryless strategies in the tree unfolding of the CGS.Wewill present both approaches.
5.3.1 Preparation
We begin by updating the mappings between path and state effectivity functions, which were
defined in Sect. 4.2withmemoryless strategies inmind. First, recall some notation introduced
in Sect. 4.1. For X ⊆ Stω, h ∈ St+, we have:
X (h) := {λ | λ ∈ X , and λ[0..k] = h where k = |h|};
E(C)(h) = {X (h) | X ∈ E(C)}.
Definition 24 (History-based state effectivity functions) A history-based state effectivity
function on a state space St is a mapping
EH : P(Agt) → (St+ → P(P(St)))
that assigns to every coalition C ⊆ Agt and every finite history h ∈ St+ a family of sets of
successor states. The elements of EH (C) are called history-based global strategic choices
of the coalition C in EH (C).
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Every CGS M for a set of agents Agt over a state space St defines the history-based state
effectivity function EHM . The function assigns to every coalition C and history h the family
of possible sets of successors of the last state of h, corresponding to the possible perfect
recall strategies ofC that produce h following a suitable collective behavior of the remaining
agents. Thus, every perfect recall strategy σC determines a history-based global strategic
choice of C that assigns to every history h the set of possible continuations of h resulting
from the agents in C following the strategy σC .
Definition 25 (History-based state projection) For a global strategic choice X ⊆ Stω, we
define its history-based state projection as the history-based global action choice X HS :
St+ → P(St) constructed as follows:
X HS(h) = {λ[i + 1] | λ ∈ X and λ[0..i] = h}.
Similarly, the history-based state projection of a path effectivity function E : P(Agt) →
P(P(Paths)) is the history-based state effectivity function EHS : P(Agt) → (St+ →
P(P(St))) that assigns to every coalition C ⊆ Agt and every finite history h ∈ St+ the
family
EHS(C)(h) = {X HS(h) | X ∈ E(C)(h)}
of sets of successor states, one for each set of paths in E(C)(h).
X HS(h) includes all the states that can appear right after prefix h in the set of paths X .
Thus, X S assigns possible successors to each finite sequence of states that can occur in the
system. This can be seen as a representation of a tree of possible finite histories admitted by
a fixed perfect recall collective strategy of the agents in C . Moreover, EHS collects all such
trees that can be “extracted” from the strategic choices of C in E .
Definition 26 (History-based path closure) Given a history-based action choice X : St+ →
P(St), we define its history-based path closure XHP ⊆ Stω as follows:
XHP = {λ | λ[i + 1] ∈ X (λ[0..i]) for all i ≥ 0}.
Likewise, the history-based path closure of a history-based state effectivity function E :
St+ × P(Agt) → P(P(St)) is defined as the path effectivity function EHP : P(Agt) →





EHP (C) = {X ⊆ Paths | XHP ⊆ X for some X ∈ E(C)}.
That is, XHP collects the paths generated by the transition tree represented by X . More-
over, EHP is the outcome-monotone closure of the family of strategic choices generated this
way from the extended state effectivity function E .
Definition 27 (History-transition closed choices and effectivity functions) A strategic choice
X is history-transition closed iff (X HS)HP = X .
A path effectivity function E is history-transition closed iff (EHS)HP = E .
As it turns out, the analogue of state-transition closed choices and state-transition closed
core for perfect recall strategies require only Emerson’s limit closure condition [15] which
we already presented in Sect. 5.2, and recall again below.
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Definition 28 (Limit closure, limit-closed core) A strategic choice X ⊆ Stω is limit-closed
iff, whenever it contains an infinite sequence of paths {λi }i∈N inX such that λi [0..i] = λ[0..i]
for every i ∈ N, then λ belongs to X , too.
The limit-closed core of E is defined as the effectivity function E lcore that selects only
limit-closed choices from E :
E lcore(C) = {X ∈ E(C) | X is limit-closed}.
Proposition 11 For any global strategic choice X ⊆ Stω, X is history-transition closed iff
X is limit-closed.
Proof We prove that (X HS)HP = X iff X is limit-closed. Essentially by definition, XHP
is limit-closed for every history-based action choice X , hence the implication from left to
right. Conversely, let X be limit-closed. First, note that X ⊆ (X HS)HP , immediately from
the definition of (X HS)HP . For the other inclusion, let λ ∈ (X HS)HP . Then, for every i ≥ 0,
we have λ[i + 1] ∈ X HS(λ[0..i]), hence λ[i + 1] = λ′[i + 1] for some λ′ ∈ X such that
λ′[0..i] = λ[0..i]. Put λi+1 = λ′. Thus, we have defined an infinite sequence {λ j } j>0 of
paths in X such that λ j [0.. j] = λ j [0.. j] for each j . By limit closure of X it follows that
λ ∈ X . Thus, we have also proved that (X HS)HP ⊆ X . unionsq
Lemma 2 Every path effectivity function E which is history-transition closed is equal to the
outcome monotone closure of its limit-closed core. Formally, for every coalition C:
E(C) = {X ⊆ Paths | X ⊇ Y ∈ E lcore(C)}.
Proof Let (EHS)HP = E . Now, letX ∈ E(C). Then,X ∈ (EHS)HP (C), hence there exists a
X ∈ EHS(C) such that XHP ⊆ X . Since XHP is limit closed,wehave that XHP ∈ E lcore(C).
Conversely, let X ⊇ Y for some limit-closed Y ∈ E(C). Then X ∈ E(C) because E(C) is
outcome-monotone. unionsq
5.3.2 Path effectivity functions in tree-like structures
Here we are going to do some technical preparation for reduction of the characterization of
path effectivity functions with perfect recall strategies to the case with memoryless strategies
in tree-like concurrent game structures.
Definition 29 (Tree-like concurrent game structures) A CGS is:
– injective, if for every state, any two different action profiles applied at that state result in
different successor states.
– tree-like, if it is injective and all states have pairwise disjoint sets of successor states.
Equivalently, a CGS is tree-like if every state has a unique maximal (i.e. not properly
extendable) history, i.e., path along the transition relation ending at that state. Note that in the
definition above we do not assume existence of a root, so a history of a state may be without
initial state, hence infinite.
Remark 2 Any state in a tree-likeCGS can be visited atmost once during a play, and therefore
memoryless and perfect recall strategies in tree-like CGSs coincide.
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Definition 30 (Tree unfolding of concurrent game structures [2,12]) The tree unfolding of
a CGS F = (Agt, St, Act, d, o) is the CGS
F̂ =
(
Agt, Ŝt, Act, d̂, ô
)
where:
– Ŝt is the set of all initial feasible histories λ[0..i] of the feasible paths λ in F ;
– d̂ : Agt × Ŝt → P(Act) assigns to each agent a and history λ[0..i] the set of actions
available to a at the last state of that history d(a, λ[i]).
– ô is the transition function defined on every history and action profile as o applied to the
last state of the history and the same action profile: ô(λ[0..i], α1, . . . , αk):=o(λ[i], α1,
. . . , αk).
Now, we define the liftings of strategies, paths, choices and effectivity functions from
concurrent game structures to their tree unfoldings.
Definition 31 (Liftings of strategies, paths and choices) Consider the tree unfolding F̂ =
(Agt, Ŝt, Act, d̂, ô) of a CGS F = (Agt, St, Act, d, o).
– Every perfect recall strategyσa of an agenta in F defines a strategy σ̂a in F̂ that prescribes
at every state in F̂ (i.e., history h in F) the actionσa(h). Likewise for coalitional strategies.
– For every path λ in F we define its lifting as the path of its initial histories λ̂ =
λ[0..0], λ[0..1], . . . λ[0..n], . . . in F̂ . Note that λ̂ is a feasible path (play) in F̂ iff λ
is a feasible path (play) in F .
– Likewise, for every set of paths X in F we define its lifting in F̂ as X̂ = {̂λ | λ ∈ X }.
– Every (abstract) path effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) is lifted accordingly
to a path effectivity function Ê : P(Agt) → P(P(Ŝtω)).
Note that:
1. Every tree unfolding of a CGS is tree-like.
2. The tree unfolding of a tree-like CGS F is isomorphic to F .
3. The mapping ·̂ defined above is a bijection between the feasible paths (plays) in the CGS
F and those in its tree unfolding F̂ .
Proposition 12 Let F̂ = (Agt, Ŝt, Act, d̂, ô) be the tree unfolding of the CGS F =
(Agt, St, Act, d, o). Then the lifting of the path effectivity function with perfect recall strate-
gies EFulMemF is precisely the path effectivity function with memoryless strategies ÊNoMemF̂
in F̂ .
Proof First, every perfect recall strategy σ of an agent or coalition in F is lifted to the
memoryless strategy σ̂ in F̂ as defined above. Conversely, every memoryless strategy in F̂ is
a lifting of a respective perfect recall strategy in F . Furthermore, a play λ in F is consistent
with a perfect recall strategy σ in F iff its lifting λ̂ is consistent with the corresponding
memoryless strategy in F̂ . Consequently, the global strategic choices in ÊNoMem
F̂
in F̂ are
precisely the liftings of the global strategic choices in EFulMemF . unionsq
5.3.3 Characterization
Now we obtain characterizations of path effectivity functions that correspond to concurrent
game structures with perfect recall strategies. Instead of repeating the work done for the case
of memoryless strategies, we can reduce that characterization to the one with memoryless
strategies in tree-like CGSs using the definitions and results from Sect. 5.3.2.
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Proposition 13 Let E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) be a path effectivity function over a set of
feasible paths Paths. Then E is history-transition closed and truly playable iff its lifting
Ê : P(Agt) → P(P(Ŝtω)) is state-transition closed and truly playable.
Proof First, suppose E is history-transition closed and truly playable. Then Ê is state-
transition closed, immediately from the definitions, as the lifting transforms histories into
states. Furthermore, the playability conditions from Definition 20 for the path effectivity
function E are directly lifted to the playability conditions for the global state effectivity
function Ê from Definition 4. Conversely, assume that Ê is state-transition closed and the
playability conditions from Definition 4 hold globally for Ê . Then, again immediately from
the definitions, E is history-transition closed. Furthermore, P-Safety andP-Liveness for E fol-
low immediately. Likewise for P-outcome Monotonicity, P-Superadditivity, P-∅-Minimality
and P-Determinacy, using the fact that E is history-transition closed and Lemma 2. We omit
the routine details. unionsq
Theorem 5 (FulMem- Representation theorem) A path effectivity function E over a state
space St and a set of feasible paths Paths equals EFulMemF for some concurrent game
structure F if and only if Paths is state-transition closed and E is truly playable and history-
transition closed.
Proof First, if E equals EFulMemF for some CGS F , then its lifting in Ê equals the path effec-
tivity function with memoryless strategies ÊNoMem
F̂
, hence it satisfies the characterization
of Theorem 4 (possibly simplified for tree-like structures). Note that the suffix, fusion and
limit closure conditions are preserved both ways by liftings of sets of paths, and hence by
liftings of path effectivity functions. Thus, E is truly playable and history-transition closed,
by Proposition 13.
Conversely, if the conditions are satisfied by E , then its lifting Ê satisfies the charac-
terization conditions of Theorem 4, hence it is equal to the path effectivity function with
memoryless strategies for some tree-like CGS over Ŝt . The latter can be regarded as the
lifting of the path effectivity function with perfect recall strategies of a respective (tree-like)
CGS over St , which is equal to E . unionsq
We now proceed with an alternative characterization that establishes internal char-
acterization of history-transition closed effectivity functions, in terms of the properties
FulMem-grounding and FulMem-convexity, stated in Proposition 14 below. Intuitively,
FulMem-grounding specifies that every strategic choice can be “grounded” onto one that
satisfies limit closure. Moreover, FulMem-convexity requires that any collection of sub-
strategies for a given coalition C can be pieced together into a global perfect recall strategy
for C .
Proposition 14 A path effectivity function E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) over feasible paths
Paths is history-transition closed iff for every C ⊆ Agt the following two conditions hold:
(FulMem-Grounding) For every Y ∈ E(C) there is X ∈ E lcore(C) such that X ⊆ Y .
(FulMem-Convexity) For every family {X h ∈ E lcore(C) | h ∈ St+} of strategic choices,
if Y(h) = X h(h) for every h, then (YHS)HP ∈ E lcore(C).
Equivalently, the condition can be formulated as follows: For every family {X h ∈
E lcore(C) | h ∈ St+}, we have that ((⋃h∈St+ X h(h)
)HS)HP ∈ E lcore(C).
Proof Follows from Propositions 10 and 13.
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First, Proposition 13 and its proof can be simplified to only state that E is history-transition
closed iff its lifting Ê : P(Agt) → P(P(Ŝtω)) is state-transition closed.
Now, if E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) is history-transition closed then (FulMem-Grounding)
follows immediately from Lemma 2 and (FulMem-Convexity) follows from Proposition 10
and the simplified Proposition 13.
The converse direction follows the proof of Proposition 10 using the simplified Proposition
13. We omit the routine details. unionsq
6 Further remarks on path effectivity
In Sect. 4, we argued that path effectivity is conceptually the best match for representing
effectivity in multi-step games, and to provide semantics to logics of long-term ability, such
as ATL and ATL*. Here, we briefly show that a single path effectivity function can be used
to derive state effectivity functions for any given temporal pattern (Sect. 6.1). Moreover, we
show how our technical results from Sect. 5 can be applied to provide insight into existing
theories of agency—in this case, the stit theory of “seeing to it that” (Sect. 6.2). Finally, we
offer some speculation on how path effectivity functions can be used to model multi-step
games with imperfect information (Sect. 6.3).
6.1 From path effectivity back to state effectivity
In Sect. 3, we showed how effectivity of agents and coalitions can be presented entirely in
terms of states (positions) in the game. Essentially, one has to devote a separate effectivity
function for each temporal pattern of interest. Thus, we need one function to describe what
properties the agents are effective for in the next moment, another one to describe which
properties can be maintained by whom forever from now on, etc. If the structures are used
to give semantics to ATL, we need three effectivity functions (E for “next”, G for “always”,
and U for “until”, like in Sect. 3). However, in the richer language of ATL*, there are
infinitelymany possible temporal patterns. For instance, we can be interested in the properties
that coalition C can enforce infinitely often (i.e., ϕ such that 〈〈C〉〉GFϕ), those that can be
maintained from some moment on (〈〈C〉〉FGϕ), ones that can be achieved at two subsequent
time points (〈〈C〉〉F(ϕ∧Xϕ)), and so forth. Thus, using the framework of state effectivity leads
to a fairly complicated picture if one is interested in coalitional effectivity with respect to
anything beyond the three standard temporal operators. On the other hand, the path effectivity
function can be used to derive state effectivity functions for all temporal patterns specifiable
in ATL*. In this sense, a path effectivity function is not only an intuitive, but also a much
more complete description of what the agents and coalitions can effect in the system. We
begin by showing how to “distill” the state effectivity functions for “next” (X), “eventually”
(F), “always” (G), and “until” (U). Then, we extend the treatment to somemore sophisticated
temporal patterns.
6.1.1 Deriving state effectivity for standard temporal operators
Definition 32 (From path to state effectivity) Let X ⊆ P(Stω) be a set of paths. The follow-
ing sets of states can be derived from X :
XX = {X ⊆ St | ∀λ∈X . λ[1] ∈ X}
X F = {X ⊆ St | ∀λ∈X ∃i . λ[i] ∈ X}
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XG = {X ⊆ St | ∀λ∈X ∀i . λ[i] ∈ X}
XU = {(X, Y ) | ∀λ∈X ∃i . (λ[i] ∈ Y and ∀0 ≤ j < i . λ[ j] ∈ X)}.
Let E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)) be a path effectivity function, and let T = X,F,G,U
be a temporal operator. We “distill” the state effectivity function for T as follows (for every





Note that EX is exactly the state projection of E (EX = E S), cf. Definition 16. We also
observe that the definitions of XX, X F, XG, and XU are straightforward, and closely follow
the semantic definitions of the corresponding temporal operators (X, F, G, and U).
Example 7 Consider path effectivity of the grand coalition in themodel of aggressive vs. con-
servative play, cf. Example 5. For effectivity with perfect recall (EFulMemM ), we get the
following (for qi = q0, q1, q2):
(EFulMemM )X(qi )({1, 2}) = {X ⊆ St | X = ∅}
(EFulMemM )F(qi )({1, 2}) = {X ⊆ St | X = ∅}
(EFulMemM )G(qi )({1, 2}) = {X ⊆ St | qi ∈ X}
(EFulMemM )U(qi )({1, 2}) = {(X, Y ) | qi ∈ X and Y = ∅, or qi ∈ Y }.
Moreover, (ENoMemM )T is the same as (EFulMemM )T for T = X,F,G,U.
The following proposition shows that Definition 32 provides an alternative characteriza-
tion of standard state effectivity functions from Sect. 3.
Proposition 15 Let M be a concurrent gamemodel with its underlying state effectivitymodel
SEM(M) = (Agt, St,E,G,U). Then, for every state q ∈ St:
1. Eq = (ENoMemM )X(q) = (EFulMemM )X(q),
2. Gq = (ENoMemM )G(q) = (EFulMemM )G(q),
3. Uq = (ENoMemM )U(q) = (EFulMemM )U(q).
Proof 1. Straightforward.
2. First, we prove that X ∈ Gq iff X ∈ (EFulMemM )G(q). Observe that Gq = E[∗]q =∞⋂
k=0
E [k]q = {X ⊆ St | ∀k . X ∈ E [k]q }. Thus, X ∈ Gq iff for all k there exists a
mapping f (h) = Yh such that: (i) f maps sequences of states h such that h[0] = q and
|h| ≤ k, to subsets of states Yh ∈ Elast (h); (ii) for every h with h[0] = q and |h| ≤ k, if
h[i] ∈ f (h[0..i − 1]) for all i = 0, . . . , k then f (h) ⊆ X . But then, f specifies a perfect
recall strategy in M such that the paths in out (q, f ) contain only states in X , which is
equivalent to X ∈ (EFulMemM )G(q).
Secondly, (ENoMemM )G(q) = (EFulMemM )G(q) follows from the fact that the perfect
recall and memoryless semantics of 〈〈C〉〉Gϕ coincide [6,33]. Take any X ⊆ St . Let
MX be model M with the valuation of propositions extended to an additional atomic
proposition p such that pMX = X (i.e., p holds exactly in the states from X ). By [6,33],
we have that MX , q |NoMem 〈〈C〉〉Gp iff MX , q |FulMem 〈〈C〉〉Gp. Thus, pMX ∈
(ENoMemMX )G(q) iff pMX ∈ (EFulMemMX )G(q). Note that M and MX differ only in their
valuations of propositions; hence, they must induce the same effectivity functions. In
consequence, we get that X ∈ (ENoMemM )G(q) iff X ∈ (EFulMemM )G(q).
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3. Analogous.
The following is an immediate consequence:
Corollary 2 For everyNoMem- orFulMem-realizable path effectivity function E , valuation
of propositions V , state q, and ATL formula ϕ, we have:
1. (E, V ), q | ϕ iff (EX, EG, EU, V ), q | ϕ.
2. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉Xϕ iff ϕ(E,V ) ∈ EXq (C), where ϕ(E,V ) = {q ′ | (E, V ), q ′ | ϕ}.
3. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉Fϕ iff ϕ(E,V ) ∈ EFq (C).
4. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉Gϕ iff ϕ(E,V ) ∈ EGq (C).
5. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ iff (ϕ(E,V ), ψ(E,V )) ∈ EUq (C).
6.1.2 Obtaining state effectivity for other temporal patterns
Proposition 15 and Corollary 2 show that path effectivity functions for concurrent game
models are at least as informative as state effectivity functions. Below, we show that the
template fromDefinition 32 can be applied to obtain state effectivity functions that correspond
to many other temporal patterns.
Definition 33 (From path to state effectivity II) For X ⊆ P(Stω), we define:
X FG = {X ⊆ St | ∀λ∈X ∃i ∀ j ≥ i . λ[ j] ∈ X}
XGF = {X ⊆ St | ∀λ∈X ∀i ∃ j ≥ i . λ[ j] ∈ X}
X F+ = {X ⊆ St | ∀λ∈X ∃i . λ[i] ∈ X and λ[i + 1] ∈ X}.





for every T = FG,GF,F+, C ⊆ Agt, and q ∈ St .
X FG collects sets of states X such that every path from X stays in X from some moment
on. XGF contains sets X such that every path from X visits X infinitely often. X F+ collects
sets X such that every path fromX stays in X for at least twomoments in a row. The following
is straightforward:
Proposition 16 For every NoMem- or FulMem-realizable path effectivity function E , val-
uation of propositions V , state q, and ATL formula ϕ, we have:
1. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉FGϕ iff ϕ(E,V ) ∈ EFGq (C).
2. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉GFϕ iff ϕ(E,V ) ∈ EGFq (C).
3. (E, V ), q | 〈〈C〉〉F(ϕ ∧ Xϕ) iff ϕ(E,V ) ∈ EF+q (C).
Note that none of the formulae is expressible in ATL [14]. Thus, EFG, EGF, and EF+ cannot
be obtained by a simple combination of EX, EG, and EU.
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6.2 Stit models vs. path effectivity
In this paper, we take coalitional effectivity models as the starting point, and show how
they can be used to model long-term interaction. So, the inspiration comes from models
that have been used in social choice theory for over 30 years. A major part of the paper is
based on the observation that, in multi-step scenarios, the outcome of the game can be seen
as the complete sequence of states (or worlds) that can possibly happen. The mathematical
structure that we obtain is surprisingly similar to models of “seeing to it that”, that have
been studied in philosophy since late 1980s. In the subsequent paragraphs, we show that stit
frames can be seen as a subclass of path effectivity functions. However, the subclass is too
general and too restricted at the same time. On the one hand, it allows for effectivity patterns
that cannot be implemented in simple multi-step games based on concurrent game structures
(cf. Sect. 6.2.2). On the other hand, it does not allow for modeling some natural patterns of
coalitional effectivity (Sect. 6.2.3).
Alternatively, stit frames canbe seen as amore complicatedwayof defining state effectivity
functions. We look closer at this interpretation in Sect. 6.2.4.
We point out that the results presented in Sects. 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 are straightforward applica-
tions of the characterizations proposed in Sect. 4. In otherwords, our results on path effectivity
directly expose some hitherto unknown (and important!) limitations of models that have been
studied for 25 years.We believe that this makes a good case for the explanatory and analytical
value of the structures and characterizations that we propose.
Remark 3 Our analysis in this section focuses on one of the existing semantics of stit, namely
the “classical” semantics based on full trees [8,11,20,22,23]. Other approaches include the
semantics based on the concept of bundled tree [13], a Kripke-style semantics based on the
concept of Ockhamist frame [24], as well as the semantics based on the concept of Kamp
frame [10]. Applying our results to the other semantics of stit is an interesting issue, but we
leave it for another study.
6.2.1 Models of “seeing to it that”
Models of “seeing to it that” have been defined in [7], taking branching time structures
as the starting point, and enhancing them to give account of how agents can influence the
dynamics of the system. For a broader discussion and extensions of stit, we refer the reader
to [8,11,20,22,23].
Formally, a stit frame is a tuple (St,<, Agt,Choice) where:
– (St,<) is a branching-time structure, i.e., a transition structure that forms a tree;
– Agt is a finite set of agents;
– Choice : Agt × St → P(P(Paths)), where Paths is the set of all maximal linearly
ordered sequences of points in (St,<),6 such that for every q ∈ St and a ∈ Agt,
Choice(a, q) is a partition of the set Paths(q) of all paths passing through q into a
family of non-empty sets. That partition represents the available choices for a at q (as in
alternating transition systems [5]).
A stit model extends a stit frame with a valuation of atomic propositions into sets of paths.
Note that, since (St,<) is a tree, we can see the elements of St as both states and (finite)
histories of interaction. To avoid confusion, they will be referred to in the remainder of this
6 In stit literature, such sequences are called histories, and their set is denoted by H . We use the term paths
here to be consistent with the terminology used throughout the paper.
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section as positions. Moreover, for stit models, the concepts of memoryless and perfect recall
play coincide.
Collective choices—when considered—are usually assumed to independently influence
the resulting evolution of the system. Thus, the outcome of a collective choice can be seen as
the intersection of the individual choices that it combines. This can be formally modeled by
extending the functionChoice to typeP(Agt)× St → P(P(Paths)) as follows. First, given
the functionChoice, for each q ∈ St a choice selection function at q is a function sq : Agt →
P(Paths(q)), such that sq(a) ∈ Choice(a, q) for each a ∈ Agt. The set of all selection
functions sq , for a given q , is denoted by Selectq . Now, for any C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St we define
Choice(C, q) = {
⋂
a∈C
sq(a) | sq ∈ Selectq
}
.
It is easy to see that Choice(C, q) forms a partition of Paths(q) refining each of the
individual partitionsChoice(a, q), fora ∈ C and representing the possible collective choices
of C .
The following condition of Independence of agents’ choices must hold for Choice:
∅ /∈ Choice(Agt, q) for all q ∈ St.
An additional assumption that is often adopted, called no choice between undivided his-
tories, will be discussed further, too.
We observe that stit models come very close to coalitional path effectivity models. In fact,
functionChoice looks pretty much like a path effectivity function. Whether it does represent
path effectivity, however, depends on how it is interpreted. The informal explanation in most
stit literature is that a choice X ∈ Choice(a, q) constrains the set of possible paths to the
ones consistent with X . In that case, function Choice clearly represents path effectivity, and
the fundamental differences to our approach are minor. We look closer at this interpretation
in Sects. 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.
On the other hand, some texts in the existing literature suggest that Choice is but a
more involved representation of state effectivity (cf. e.g. [11,22]). We discuss the latter
interpretation in Sect. 6.2.4.
6.2.2 Stit models are too general
Assuming that X ∈ Choice(C, q) simply collects the paths that may result from agents C
choosing X at position q , we get that Choice(C, q) describes the effectivity of C in q in the
following manner.
Definition 34 Let S = (St,<, Agt,Choice) be a stit frame. The path effectivity function
of S, denoted E(S), is defined as
E(S)(C) =
{






Additionally, we define E(S)(∅) = {Paths}.
That is, E(S)(C) is the outcome-monotone closure of the set of all global combinations
of choices from Choice(C, ·).
Proposition 17 For every stit frame S, we have that E(S) satisfies P-Safety, P-Liveness,
P-OutcomeMonotonicity, P-Superadditivity, and P-∅-Minimality. It does not have to satisfy
P-Determinacy.
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Proof Straightforward. unionsq
Corollary 3 Path effectivity in stit frames is playable, but not necessarily truly playable.
Thus, path effectivity in stit frames satisfies most, though not all, general playability
conditions. More importantly, it does not have to satisfy the structural conditions that make
effectivity patterns implementable in natural multi-step games. We focus on realizability
under perfect recall, since realizability in memoryless strategies can be seen as its special
case.
Proposition 18 E(S) is generally not history-transition closed.
Proof (sketch) Let us construct a stit frame S as follows. Take an arbitrary nontrivial
stit frame (St,<, Agt,Choice) and replace its Choice function with Choice′ such that
Choice′(a, q) = {X ∈ Choice(a, q) | X is not limit-closed} for every a ∈ Agt, q ∈ St .
Suppose now that E(S) is history-transition closed. By Proposition 11 and Lemma 2, it
must include choices that are limit closed, which is not the case. unionsq
Corollary 4 There are stit frames whose path effectivity cannot be realized in concurrent
game structures.
6.2.3 Stit models are too restricted
On one hand, stit frames describe effectivity patterns that can be non-truly playable and
non-realizable in both NoMem and FulMem sets of strategies. On the other hand, the way
they construct coalitional effectivity allows only for strictly additive aggregation of abilities.
In other words, no synergy between members of a coalition can be modeled in a stit frame.
Proposition 19 (P-Additivity) For every q ∈ St and C ∩ D = ∅, we have:
1. if X ∈ E(S)(C) and Y ∈ E(S)(D) then X ∩ Y ∈ E(S)(C ∪ D);
2. if Z ∈ E(S)(C ∪ D) then there exist X ∈ E(S)(C) and Y ∈ E(S)(D) such that
Z = X ∩ Y .
Proof Follows by construction of Choice(C, q). unionsq
Since P-Additivity is strictly stronger than P-Superadditivity, by Theorems 4 and 5 we get
the following:
Corollary 5 There are concurrent game structures generating path effectivity functions that
cannot be obtained in stit frames.
6.2.4 Stit models as representations of state effectivity
In some works (cf., e.g., [11,22]), it is assumed that if two paths λ1, λ2 passing through
position q share the same successor of q then every choice at q must either include both paths
or none of them. The assumption is sometimes referred to as “no choice between undivided
histories” (NCBUH). Paraphrasing Horty’s explanation, since the branching between λ1 and
λ2 is not happening yet, the uncertainty which path will occur can only be resolved in the
future. Formally, this amounts to the following requirement:
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– For every q, q ′ ∈ St such that q < q ′, all paths in Pathsq ′ belong to the same choices
of all agents at q , i.e., for every λ, λ′ ∈ Pathsq ′ , for each X ∈ Choice(Agt, q), either
λ, λ′ ∈ X or λ, λ′ /∈ X .
– [11] assumes additionally that the choice function is deterministic in the following sense:
for each q there exists q ′ such that Choice(Agt, q) = Pathsq ′ .
Under the NCBUH assumption (with or without determinism), Choice(a, q) can be seen
as collecting sets of successor states that agent a can enforce in q . In fact, under this assump-
tion, stit frames become just a more complicated way of representing tree-like alternating
transition systems [5,17]. Agents’ abilities in NCBUH stit frames arise from available strate-
gies which are called selection functions in the stit literature.7
Formally, function Choice can be transformed into a state effectivity function in the fol-
lowing way:
Definition 35 Let S = (St,<, Agt,Choice) be a stit frame satisfying the above conditions.
The state effectivity function of S is defined as
E(S)(C, q) = (Choice(C, q)|q)S .
That is, we take all the choices X ∈ Choice(C, q), and for each X collect the immediate
successors of q on paths in X .
Under this interpretation, stit models are just a more complicated way of representing one-
step effectivity. The role of strategies (a.k.a. selection functions) is to unfold state effectivity
into path effectivity, similarly to Definitions 17, 19, and 26.
Proposition 20 For every NCBUH stit frameS, we have that E(S) satisfies Safety,Liveness,
OutcomeMonotonicity, Superadditivity, andAgt-Maximality. P-Determinacy is satisfied for
deterministic frames, but not in general.
Proof Straightforward. unionsq
Moreover, stit frames do not enable modeling synergy within coalitions.
Proposition 21 (Additivity) For every q ∈ St and C ∩ D = ∅, we have additionally that:
– if Z ∈ E(S)(C ∪ D, q) then there exist X ∈ E(S)(C, q) and Y ∈ E(S)(D, q) such that
Z = X ∩ Y .
Proof Follows by construction of Choice(C, q). unionsq
In consequence, not every stit frame represents state effectivity that can be implemented
with a strategic game (because effectivity is strategic games must satisfy Determinacy).
Moreover, not every state effectivity function, implementable in strategic games, can be
represented by a stit frame (because stit frames do not allow for non-additive coalitional
effectivity patterns).
6.3 Beyond perfect information
So far, we have been only concerned with games where every player knows the global
state of the system at any moment. Modeling and reasoning about imperfect information
7 Recall that on tree-like structures memoryless and perfect recall strategies coincide.
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scenarios is more sophisticated. First, not all strategies are executable—even in the perfect
recall case. This is because an agent cannot specify that she will execute two different actions
in situations that look the same to her. Therefore, only uniform strategies are admissible here
(for the definition of uniformity, see below). Moreover, it is often important to find a uniform
strategy that succeeds in all indistinguishable states, rather than contend that there is such a
successful strategy for the current global state of the system.
In this section, we briefly sketch how path effectivity models can be used to give account
on powers of coalitions under imperfect information. This is by no means intended as an
exhaustive analysis. Rather, we point out that the modeling power of path effectivity can be
applied to more sophisticated scenarios than ones assuming complete knowledge.
6.3.1 Reasoning about imperfect information games
We take Schobbens’ ATLir and ATLi R [33] as the “core”, minimal ATL-based logics for
strategic ability under imperfect information. The logics include the same formulae as ATL,
only the cooperation modalities are presented with subscripts. The operator 〈〈C〉〉ir indicates
that we reason about agents with imperfect information and imperfect recall, while 〈〈C〉〉iR
indicates that agents have imperfect information and perfect Recall. Models of ATLir and
ATLir are imperfect information concurrent game models (iCGM), which can be seen as
concurrent game models augmented with a family of indistinguishability relations ∼a⊆
St × St , one per agent a ∈ Agt. The relations describe agents’ uncertainty: q ∼a q ′ means
that, while the system is in state q , agent a considers it possible that it is in q ′. Each ∼a is an
equivalence relation. It is also required that agents have the same choices in indistinguishable
states: if q ∼a q ′ then d(a, q) = d(a, q ′). Additionally, for two histories h, h′, we define
h ≈a h′ iff |h| = |h′| and for every i it holds that h[i] ∼a h′[i].
A uniform memoryless strategy for agent a is a function sa : St → Act , such that: (1)
sa(q) ∈ d(a, q); (2) if q ∼a q ′ then sa(q) = sa(q ′). A uniform perfect recall strategy
for agent a is a function sa : St+ → Act , such that: (1) sa(h) ∈ d(a, last (h)); (2) if
h ≈a h′ then sa(h) = sa(h′). Again a collective strategy is uniform if it contains only
uniform individual strategies. Function out (q, sC ) returns the set of all paths that may result
from agents C executing strategy sC from state q onward. The semantics of cooperation
modalities in ATL∗ir and ATL∗i R is defined as follows:
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉irγ iff there exists a uniform memoryless strategy sC such that, for each
a ∈ C , q ′ such that q ∼a q ′, and path λ ∈ out (sC , q ′), we have M, λ | γ .
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉iRγ iff there exists a uniform perfect recall strategy sC such that, for each
a ∈ C , q ′ such that q ∼a q ′, and path λ ∈ out (sC , q ′), we have M, λ | γ .
The semantics of path formulae γ is defined exactly like in standard ATL*, see Sect. 2.3.
The same applies to Boolean combinations of state formulae.
Example 8 Consider the model of aggressive vs. conservative play from Example 1 with
the following twist: now, each player can only perceive his own situation in the game, and
not the position of the other player. Thus, player 1 cannot distinguish between states q0, q2
while player 2 cannot discern states q0, q1. The resulting iCGM is presented in Fig. 2.
Now, no agent can make sure anymore that the other one remains in a good position:
M2, q0 | 〈〈1〉〉irX good2 and M2, q0 | 〈〈2〉〉irX good1. This is because player 1 in state
q0 must take into account the possibility of being in state q1 for which he has no sure
strategy of getting to {q0, q2}. The situation of player q2 is analogous. It is not even the case
that the respective players can achieve the property in a finite number of steps: M2, q0 |
〈〈1〉〉irF good2 and M2, q0 | 〈〈2〉〉irF good1.
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Fig. 2 A model of aggressive vs. conservative play with imperfect information: M2. Dashed lines represent
indistinguishability relations between states
On the other hand, if the players cooperate then they can still control the next state
in the game: M2, q | 〈〈1, 2〉〉irX(good1 ∧ good2) ∧ 〈〈1, 2〉〉irX(good1 ∧ ¬good2) ∧
〈〈1, 2〉〉irX(¬good1 ∧ good2) for all states q . We leave checking this to an interested reader,
and only remark that such a tight control of the successor state is rather incidental to the
scenario, and does not hold in general for imperfect information models.
6.3.2 Path effectivity under imperfect information
First, we observe that the same type of effectivity functions can be used to model powers
in imperfect information games: E : P(Agt) → P(P(Stω)). Moreover, the notion of Σ-
effectivity does not change much. Given an iCGM M and Σ = ⋃C⊆Agt ΣC be a set of
(uniform) coalitional strategies in M , the Σ-effectivity function of M is still defined as
EΣM (C) = {
⋃
q∈St out (q, sC ) | sC ∈ ΣC }. We refer to uniform strategies as uFulMem (for
perfect recall) and uNoMem (for memoryless strategies).
Example 9 Let us “distill” the path effectivity of agent 1 alone inmodel M2 fromExample 8.
We get that EuNoMemM2 ({1}) is the outcome-monotone closure of {X1,X2,X3,X4}, where:
– X1 = (q0 ∪ q1)ω ∪ qω2 ∪ q+2 q1(q0 ∪ q1)ω corresponds to player 1’s strategy of playing
conservatively in every state,
– X2 = (q0 ∪ q1)ω ∪ qω2 ∪ q+2 q0(q0 ∪ q1)ω corresponds to the strategy of playing
conservatively in {q0, q1} and aggressively in q2,
– X3 = qω0 ∪ qω1 ∪ (q+0 ∪ q+1 ∪ 
)q+2 (q0 ∪ q2)ω corresponds to the strategy of playing
aggressively in every state,
– X4 = qω0 ∪ qω1 ∪ (q+0 ∪ q+1 ∪ 
)q+2 (q1 ∪ q2)ω corresponds to the strategy of playing
aggressively in {q0, q1} and conservatively in q2.
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6.3.3 Semantics of ATL∗ir/R based on path effectivity
The semantics of ATL∗ir/R , based on path effectivity functions, can be defined in a very
similar way to the perfect information case (cf. Sect. 4.4). Let [q]C = ⋃a∈C {q ′ | q ∼a q ′}
be the indistinguishability set of state q for coalition C . We extend notation so that X (Q) =⋃
q∈Q X (q) denotes all the paths in X starting from any state in Q ∈ St . Moreover, let
γ M = {λ ∈ PathsM | M, λ | γ } denote the set of paths in M satisfying γ . Then:
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉irγ iff there is X ∈ EuNoMemM (C) such that X ([q]C ) ⊆ γ M .
M, q | 〈〈C〉〉iRγ iff there is X ∈ EuFulMemM (C) such that X ([q]C ) ⊆ γ M .
That is, 〈〈C〉〉ir/Rγ holds iffC have a single choice satisfying γ on all outcome paths starting
from states that look the same as q .
Example 10 Choice X1 from Example 9 can be used to demonstrate that M2, q0 |
〈〈1〉〉irG good1, because X1({q0, q1}) = (q0 ∪ q1)ω. On the other hand, M2, q2 |
〈〈1〉〉irG good2 because X1({q2}) = qω2 ∪ q+2 q1(q0 ∪ q1)ω does not guarantee G good2
(and similarly for X2, X3, and X4). Still, a more sophisticated ATL* property holds:
M2, q2 | 〈〈1〉〉irF(G good1 ∨ G good2): the strategy behind X1 guarantees that, from some
moment on, either player 1 or player 2 remains in a good position forever.
6.3.4 Properties of path effectivity under uncertainty: general playability
Section 6.3.2 demonstrated that path effectivity of agents and coalitions under imperfect
information can be represented by functions of the same type as for perfect information
games. Moreover, distilling the effectivity function from an iCGS proceeds in the same way
as before. What possibly changes is the structural properties of effectivity functions that are
induced by iCGM’s. We recall the properties below, starting with the general playability
conditions from Sect. 5.1.
P-Safety: E(C)(q) is non-empty for every C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St .
P-Liveness: ∅ /∈ E(C)(q) for every C ⊆ Agt, q ∈ St .
P-Outcome Monotonicity: For every C ⊆ Agt the set E(C) is upwards closed: if X ∈
E(C) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ Paths then Y ∈ E(C).
P-Superadditivity: For every C, D ⊆ Agt, if C ∩ D = ∅, X ∈ E(C) and Y ∈ E(D), then
X ∩ Y ∈ E(C ∪ D).
P-∅-Minimality: E(∅) is the singleton {Paths}.
P-Determinacy: For every q ∈ St , if X ∈ E(Agt) then {λ} ∈ E(Agt)(q) for some
λ ∈ X (q).
The following is straightforward, and we leave it for the interested reader to check:
Proposition 22 For every iCGM M, the induced path effectivity functions for uniform mem-
oryless strategies (EuNoMemM ) and for uniform perfect recall strategies (EuFulMemM ) satisfy
P-Safety, P-Liveness, P-Outcome Monotonicity, P-Superadditivity, P-∅-Minimality, and P-
Determinacy.
6.3.5 Properties of path effectivity under uncertainty: realizability in memoryless
strategies
We observe first that the grounding condition holds for memoryless strategies.
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Proposition 23 For every iCGM M we have that effectivity in memoryless strategies satisfies
NoMem-Grounding.
Formally, for every X ∈ EuNoMemM (C) there exists Y ∈ EuNoMemM (C) such that Y ⊆ X
and Y is state-transition closed (i.e., (Y S)P = Y).
Proof LetX ∈ EuNoMemM (C). Then, there must exist a memoryless unform strategy sC such
that
⋃
q∈St out (q, sC ) ⊆ X . By construction,
⋃
q∈St out (q, sC ) is state-transition closed. unionsq
On the other hand, the convexity condition is no longer valid:
Proposition 24 There exists an iCGM M for which effectivity in memoryless strategies does
not satisfy NoMem -Convexity. Formally, EuNoMemM includes a family of state-transition






Proof Consider EuNoMemM2 ({1}) from Example 9, and observe that X1,X2,X3,X4 are state-
transition closed by construction. Take Y = X1({q0, q2}) ∪ X3(q1). That is, player 1 plays
conservatively on paths starting from q0 or q2, and aggressively on paths starting from q1.
The state projection of Y is:
– Y S(q0) = {q0, q1}
– Y S(q1) = {q1, q2}
– Y S(q2) = {q1, q2}.
Thus, (Y S)P = (q1 ∪ q2)ω ∪ qω0 ∪ q+0 q1(q1 ∪ q2)ω. Now we show that (Y S)P is an
outcome-monotone extension of neither X1 nor X2 nor X3 nor X4. First, (Y S)P subsumes
neitherX1 norX2 because it does not subsume (q0∪q1)ω. Secondly, (Y S)P subsumes neither
X3 nor X4 because it does not subsume q2(q0 ∪ q2)ω. Thus, (Y S)P /∈ EuNoMemM2 ({1}). unionsq
As a consequence, the NoMem-Representation Theorem from Sect. 5.2 no longer holds
for imperfect information:
Corollary 6 There are iCGM’s whose path effectivity functions in memoryless uniform
strategies are not state-transition closed.
6.3.6 Properties of path effectivity under uncertainty: realizability in perfect recall
strategies
Again, the grounding condition holds:
Proposition 25 For every iCGM M we have that effectivity in perfect recall strategies sat-
isfies FulMem-Grounding.
Formally, for every X ∈ EuFulMemM (C) there exists Y ∈ EuFulMemM (C) such that Y ⊆ X
and Y is history-transition closed.
Proof Analogous to Proposition 23. unionsq
On the other hand, the convexity condition is no longer valid:
Proposition 26 There exists an iCGMM forwhich effectivity in perfect recall strategies does
not satisfy FulMem -Convexity. Formally, EuFulMemM includes a family of history-transition
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Proof Consider EuFulMemM2 ({1}) and observe that EuNoMemM2 ({1}) ⊆ EuFulMemM2 ({1}) since all
memoryless strategies are also perfect recall strategies.Moreover,X1,X2,X3,X4 are history-
transition closed by construction. Again, take Y = X1({q0, q2})∪X3(q1). The history-based
state projection of Y is:
– YHS(. . . q0) = {q0, q1}
– YHS(. . . q1) = {q1, q2}
– YHS(. . . q2) = {q1, q2}.
Thus, (YHS)P =(q1∪q2)ω∪qω0 ∪q+0 q1(q1∪q2)ω. However, there is noY ′ ∈ EuFulMemM2 ({1})
that would subsume both (q1 ∪ q2)ω and q0qω1 . unionsq
As a consequence, the FulMem-Representation Theorem from Sect. 5.3 no longer holds
for imperfect information:
Corollary 7 There are iCGM’s whose path effectivity functions in uniform perfect recall
strategies are not history-transition closed.
SummaryWehave obtained a partial characterization of path effectivity inmulti-step games of
imperfect information. General playability conditions hold, as well as grounding conditions
in both memoryless and perfect recall cases. On the other hand, convexity does not hold for
both types of uniform strategies. A complete characterization is outside of the scope of this
paper, and we leave a detailed study of sufficient realizability conditions under imperfect
information for future research.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed the idea of characterizing multi-player multi-step games in
terms of what coalitions can enforce which sets of outcomes—states or paths—by executing
one or another collective strategy. These characterizations lead to respective notions of state-
based and path-based coalition effectivity models.We believe the characterizations to be both
conceptually important and technically interesting, as they extract the core game-theoretic
“essence” from game models. They also provide alternative semantics for logics of such
games, most notably for the game logics ATL and ATL*.
We show how the new characterizations can be applied to gain insight into properties of
the well known stit models of agency. We also use path effectivity functions to highlight (and
partially resolve) some technical issues arising in the semantics of ATL* for scenarios of
incomplete and imperfect information. We would also like to point out that a better under-
standing of abstract realizability can lead to satisfiability checking procedures and complete
axiomatic characterization for the variants of ATL where such results have not been estab-
lished yet, e.g., for ATL* as well as all the variants of ATL/ATL* with imperfect information.
We leave this final item for future work.
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